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Some implications of the information 
content of expressed attitudes are discussed, 
and the literature on attitude change reviewed 
with this attitude-dimension in mind. 226 .§s 
responded to a scala measuring attitudes 
toward Africans, either on an individual basis 
in writing, or orally under pro- or anti-African 
normative pressure in an Asch-type situation. 
The confederates were successively replaced by 
naive .§s. Extreme attitude change was found, 
but the personality correlates of change were 
unclear. A laboratory analogue of the 
perpetuation of attitudinal norms was 
successfully provided. These and certain 





















Two preliminary observations should be made concerning 
this literature. Firstly, research on attitude change has surprisingly 
infrequently been concerned with what might be called, by however liberal 
an interpretation of the phrase, "ideological shift". It has usually 
been confined to investigating minimal quantitative changes in attitude 
to social issues of little salience to the subjects. In fact, the body 
of literature is more suggestive of Procrustean Man, than -of Protean Man. 
A second characteristic 'of most research on attitude change 
over the years, is that change has seldom been viewed as adaptation to 
"divergent social worlds". It has usually been conceptualised as a 













According to Lifton (1968), we are living in the age of 
In contemporary literature, the zeitgeist is epitomized 
by Saul Bellow's fictio~al characters, such as Augie Ma~ch, "a picaresque 
hero with a notab+e talent for adapting himself to divergent social-worlds 11 
(Lifton, 1968, p.l8). Lifton asserts that 
11until relatively recently, no more thari one ideological 
shift was likely to occur in a lifetime, and that one would be long 
remembered· as a significant individual turning-point accompanied by 
profound soul-searching and conflict. But today it is not unusual 
to encounter several such shifts, accomplished relatively painlessly, 
within a year or even a month;· •••• the rarity is a man who has 
gone through life holding firmly to a single ideological vision'' (p.21). 
The rise of Protean Man has been parallelled by an 
explosion in the psychological literature on attitude change. 
A perusal of Psychological Abstracts from 1949 through 1967 reveals a 
positively accelerated growth curve for the number of publications 
indexed under "attitude change" (see Fig. 1) • 
1. 
These two observations may be causally related to each 
other. It is not unlikely that attitudes involving salient issues, which 
play an important part in an individual's adaptation to his social 
environment, are resistant to change by means of "propaganda" messages. 
Change in such attitudes may necessitate changing the social environments 
in which they operate, while attitudes involving low-salience issues may 
be amenable to modification through standard communication procedures. 
Such an analysis does not imply that attitudes involving 
salient issues are necessarily "enduring organisations of motivational, 
emotional, perceptual and cognitive processes with respect to the same 
aspect of the individual's world11 (Krech and Crutchfield, 1948, p.l52) 
and therefore, by definition, "relatively" difficult to change. It 
implies merely that these attitudes are relatively enduring within 
static social-psychological environments. It is possibly from the 
multiplicity of modern man's reference groups that the ideological 
lability referred to by Lifton derives. The implication is that 
traditional techniques of persuasion may be inappropriate when applied 
to such attitudes. This point can be appreciated most clearly by 
viewing people as producers, rather than mere passive consumers of 
.. - · attitudes. Expressed attitudes are themselves communications • 
1.1 THE VALUE-INFORMATION CONTENT OF ATTITUDES 
To the extent that attitudes represent patterned 
'(i.e., nonrandom) responses of individuals to their psychological 
environments, they convey information. That is to say, if an individual 
P expresses an attitude in the presence of a second individual 0, he 
ther~by conveys information about himself to 0. This information may 
or may not be useful to 0 in evaluating P. 
If, for example, P meets 0, a deeply committed pacifist, 
for the first time, and expresses a warlike attitude, 0 is likely to 
evaluate P unfavourably. It is clear that P's expressed attitude 
conveys information which enables 0 to evaluate him. If, on the other 
hand, 0 likes whiskey and soda, and P expresses a dislike for whiskey 
and soda, the information about P · thus obtained· is hardly likely to 
enable 0 to evaluate P. It can therefore be said that P's warlike 
attitude in the first example conveyed a considerable amount of value-
information to 0, while in the second example P's attitude conveyed 
very little value-information. 
The value-information content of an expressed attitude is 
I . 
a product of the total information content of the attitude and the 
salience of the issue for the recipient. The total information content 
depends upon its probability in the ensemble of all possible attitudes 
toward the psychological object: . had P in the first example above 
expressed an unfavourable attitude toward murder, very little fnformation 
would have been conveyed and 0 would not have been able to evaluate him. 
4. 
Had he, on the other hand, expressed a favourable attitude toward murder, 
a great deal of information would have been conveyed. The salience of 
the issue for the recipient depends upon his value system. The higher 
the salience in the recipient's value heirarchy of the issue, the higher 
the value-information content of the expressed attitude for that recipient. 
Thus P's warlike attitude in the above example is likely to convey little 
value-information to a recipient 0 for whom the pacifism/war issue has 
low salience. 
More specifically, the value-information content of an 
attitude for the producer of the attitude is given by 
liY. • -lo&f x ..§. 
where P is the inferred probability of the attitude in the ensemble of 
all possible attitudes on the issue, and S is the inferred salience of 
the_ issue- for the recipient. The true salience is defined by 
where r is the correlation between the recipient's favourable or un-
favourable evaluations of members of a population of individuals and his 
subjective impressions of their attitudes on the issue. (It follows 
that£ 2 is the amount of variance in his evaluations of people accounted 
for by their inferred attitudes on the issue). 
5. 
When the producer of the attitude knows the recipient very 
well 
~ ... ~( t) 
holds approximately. Should he, however, lack any knowledge of the 
/ 
recipient, or should there be a large audience present, his estimate o~ 
the mean value of 2(t) for the population can be substitute~ 
It follows that BY represents the extent to which the 
producer of an attitude expects to be positively or ne~atively evaluated 
as a result of expressing that attitude. 
A comment needs to be made on these derivations. 11Man as 
an intuitive statistician" usually fails to extract all the information 
from a communication (Peterson and Beach, 1967). The inferred values 
of f and ~ are therefore likely to be conservative estimates of their 
true values. The subjective values, which are renliriiscerit of Rotter's 
(1954) "subjective probability of reinforcement", are therefore preferred. 
Also, the base of the logarithm, which represents the subjective number 
of alternatives, will in most cases be about 7 (I-1iller,- i956). 
If it can be-assumed that people are motivated to behave 
in a manner which is likely to result in their being favourably evaluated 
by others (cf. Festinger, 1954), then it can be deduced from the above 
discussion that attitudes of high value-information content (li.Y,) will 
be greatly determined by the subjective-social environments of the 
attitude-producers. One may predict that such attitudes will be 
resistant to change through rational or personal appeal, but extremely 
susceptible to change in response to "changing social worlds". 
6. 
7 • 
.. To take an extreme imaginary example: suppose an individu~ 
who holds a certain attitude on an issue finds himself in a social 
situation in which he judges the issue to be highly salient, and he further 
judges his initial attitude to be shared by no other member of the group. 
In such a situation, since .§ is very high and f is very low, ]! is 
very high. If the individual is called upon to express an attitude on 
the issue, he will expect to be evaluated to a great ex~ent by his 
attitude. Assuming that he wish~s to be evaluated favoUrably, he is 
likely to modify his initial attitude in conformity with the group norm 
as he perceives it. The amount of attitude change will probably depend 
upon a number of personality factors, together with the salience of the 
issue for the individual himself. 
The above discussion draws attention to a'dimension of 
.. 
attitudes whose implications for this study will be amplified after a 
selective survey of the literature on attitude change, examining the 
extent to which this dimension has implicitly been considered by previous 
workers. 
1.2 Attitude change. 
The decline of the three great nineteenth century schools 
· of psychology was accompanied by a three-front attack on several important 
fields of psychological investigation. The classic example is found in 
learning theory, but the field of attitude change provides an equally 
clear illustration. 
The nineteenth century schools had concerned themselves with 
I 
different sorts of problems. It is no accident that the groundwork of 
contemporary learning theory is to be found in the ideas of the early 
behaviourists, while modern motivation theory leans heavily on early 
psychoanalytic psychology, and present day ideas about perception/ 
cognition derive in large measure from Gestalt Psychology (Boring, 1950). 
A tripartate classification of twantie.th century approaches to attitude 
change may thus co~veniently be labelled according to t}1e theoretical 
orientation, as the S-R, t4e motivational, and the perc~ptual/cognitive 
approaches. 
1.21 The S-R approach. 
A vast amount of empirical research on attitude change was .. 
initiated at Yale.University under the directorship of Carl. 1. Hovland. 
After working for some years with C.L. Hull on stimulus ge~eralisation, 
Hovland was drawn into social psychology during the war, as a result of 
the need for empirical information concerning propaganda and counter-
propaganda. The communication variables studied by these workers are 
traditionally classified according to the formula : "Who (source) says 
~t (message) to~ (recipients) through which medium (channel) with 
what effect". (Smith, Lasswell, and Casey, 1946). 
Concerning the source, Hovland and his co-workers have 
concentrated primarily on investigating the nature of credibility. It 
had already been demonstrated in research done before the war that 
communications emanating from high-prestige sources result in greater 
attitude change than those emanating from low-prestige sources 
a. 
(e.g. Arnet, Davidson and Lewis, 1931; Bowden, Caldwell and West, 1934;· 
and Kulp, 1934) • However Hovland and \'Ieiss (1951) contributed the non-
obvious finding that the credibili~ effect dissipates over time. That 
is to say, there fs a decrease in the effect of material emanating from 
'high-prestige sources and an increase in the effect of material emanating 
from low-prestige sources. This "sleeper effect" was replicated by 
Weiss (1953), while Kelman and Hovland (1953) demonstrated that it is 
impossible to reduce the effect simply by reminding the"audience of the 
source's high or low credibility. It.was also demonstrated that 
credibility is compounded of "trustworthiness" and "expertness" in the 
eyes of the recipients (Hovland, Janis, and Kelly, 1953). 
In investigating the variables of the message relevant in 
attitude change situations, the first problem tackled by Hovland and his 
collaborators was that of one-sided versus two-sided communications. 
The findings of this series of experiments are complicated. Two-sided 
.(qualified) messages are most effective in inducing attitude change in 
individuals who are initially opposed to the point of view presented, 
while one-sided messages are more effective with recipients who are · 
already convinced of the point of view being presented. A similar· 
interaction was found with the level of education of the audience, better~ 
educated individuals responding more favourably to two-sided messages and 
tending to be suspicious of one-sided messages. These findings were 
summarised by Hovland, Lumsdaine and Sheffield (1949). They have been 
replicated and extended by Insko (1962) and Wrench· (1964); ·while· 
Lumsdaine and Janis (195~) have demonstrated greater resistance to 
counter-propaganda resulting from two-sided communications. 
9. 
The second message variable to be investigated was primacy 
versus recency. In the late 1950's, Hovland and his associates published 
the now well-known "The order of presentation in persuasion" (Hovland et. 
al., 1957). -Prior to this publication, the literature on primacy-recency 
was contradictory. Lund (1925) had established the "law of primacy in 
persuasion11 , which states that when two sides of an argument are presented, 
the first presented side has the advantage. Subsequent investigation 
appeared at first to confirm the law (e.g. Knower, 1936), and then to 
contradict it (e.g. Cromwell, 1950), several writers reporting that 
recency was the dominating factor. Hovland et. al. (1957) replicated 
some of these experiments indicating that the primacy effect was at +east 
extremely unstable. It has since been shown that the primacy effect 
interacts with a number of other message variables. Hig~ly familiar 
material (Lana, 1961), controversial (Lana, 1963a), interesting (Lana, 
l963b), and nonsalient (Rosnow and Goldstein, 1967) material makes for 
primacy. Their opposites yield recency (Lana, 1961). Attempts to fit 
these findings into a theoretical framework, according to reviews by 
Lana (1964) and McGuire (1966) have not been very successful. The best 
attempt is probably Miller and Campbell's (1959) adaptation of Ebbinghaus 
decay cUrves to predict conditions most favourable to primacy and recency 
effects. 
A third message variable to be investigated-by the S-R 
approach was the emotional versus rational dimension. · Emotional appeals 
had already been found to be generally more effective (e.g. Hartmann, 1936), 
but there are probably interaction effects involving familiarity, "strength'' 
of argument and the like (Sears and Freedman, 1965; \~eiss, Rawson and 
Pasamanick, 1963). The Yale workers have concentrated more specifically 
10. 
on the efficacy of fear-arousing appeals. Janis and Feshbach (1953) 
conducted a now-famous experiment demonstrating that the greater the 
threat, the less the resulting attitude change. However the generality 
1,. 
of these results has recently been repeatedly challenged (e.g. Smith, 1966). 
McGuire (1967) has recently attempted to reconcile the conflicting findings 
on fear-arousing appeals by suggesting that high-threat appeals decrease 
audience receptivity to .the message, at the same time as they increase 
the liability of the audience to yield to whatever is received. This 
results in a hypothetical nonmonotonic function for the threat·(fear) -
compliance relationship. 
In studying variables of the recipients relevant to 
attitude change, the Yale school workers tried to isolate through 
experimental investigation the correlates of persuasibility. A general 
factor of persuasibility was identified, (Janis and Hovland, 1959), but 
persuasibility appears often to depend upon source, message, channel and 
situation factors. For example, Weiss and Fine (1955) demonstrated that 
hostile, extrapunitive personalities are-most strongly affected by a 
message favouring harsh treatment of juvenile delinquents. 
With respect to general persuasibility, the findings are 
somewhat confused. There is literature, for example, suggesting the 
relationship between I.Q. and persuasibili ty to be positive (Hyman and 
Sheatsley, 1947; Swanson, 1951), negative (Carment, Schwartz and Miles, 
1963; Carment, Miles and Cervin, 1965), and Null (e.g. Murphy, Murphy 
and Newcomb, 1937) •• The relationship between sex and persuasibili ty 
has been clearly demonstrated by the Yale workers: females tend to be 
more susceptible to persuasive communications than males (Janis and Field, 
11. 
1959; King, 1959; Whittaker, 1965). Numerous personality variables 
--have been investigated as possible correlates of communication-free 
persuasibility. The one which has given the most consistent positive 
results is self-esteem. It appears that low self-esteem is predictive 
of susceptibility to soCial influence of any kind (Leventhal and Perloe, 
1962; Dabbs, 1964; Silverman, 1964; Crowne and Conn, 1964; Cox and 
Bauer, 1964; Cohen, 1964; Gollob and Di:ttes, 1965). This personali~ 
variable has also appeared in the literature on susceptibility to 
hypnosis (Barber, 1964) and conformit,y (Crutchfield, 1955). It is one 
of the factors which will be investigated in the present study. 
As far as the channel is concerned-, results of research in 
the S-R tradition may be summarised without elaboration: other things 
being equal, face-to-face communication is most effective, followed in 
descending order of effectiveness by films, television, and radio, with 
the written word least effective of all. Thus the more impersonal the 
medium, the less attitude change is to be expected (see the review by 
Weiss, 1968). 
The S-R approach to attitude change is characterised by a 
low degree of theorising and a high degree of experimental rigour. 
Perhaps it can best be described as a tactical approach rather than a 
strategic one; it is concerned with providing well~validated quantitative 
. . -
data concerning details of independent variable manipulation which are of 
immediate usefulness to people actually engaged in changing peoples' 
attitudes. This is perhaps not surprising when one considers the circum-
stances which gave birth to the approach. 
12. 
The highly artificial nature of the experimental situations 
from which the empirical findings described above were derived, raises the 
whole question of the extent to which these findings can be generalised to 
"real-life" situations. In a classic paper comparing the experimental and 
field~study approaches, Hovland (1959) has ind~lged in some trenchant self-
. criticism along these lines. 
- Firstly, in most of the experimental populations, high-school. 
students and college sophomores are heavily overrepresented, but as Tolman 
has pointed out : "sophomores may not be people". In all probability,. 
students, who are trained to be receptive to new ideas, are more persuasible 
· than the general population. Secondly the experimental audience is a 
captive audience, while in the "real-life" situation it is restricted to 
those viho expose themselves to the communications. Thirdly, the time-
interval sampled in the experimental situations is usually very short, while 
in "real life" attitude change may often be a slow .process occurring over a 
considerable period of time. 
But the most devastating criticisms of the whole S-R approach 
are (a). that it is fitted to a naive model of attitude change, and (b) that 
the issues almost invariably used in the experimental situations are of very 
low salience for the subjects. Hovland (1959) has made this latter point 
quite clear: 
nwe usually deliberately try to find types of issues 
involving attitudes which are susceptible to modification through 
communication. Otherwise we rUn the risk of no measurable effects, 
particularly with small-scale experiments" (p. 11). 
13. 
14. 
·· The experiments are, in fact, largely confined to studies 
involving attitudes on nonsalient issues. A related fact is that the 
model (which is taken from consumer research) ignores the social context 
in 1vhich attitudes of high value-information operate and change. The 
message is viewed as emanating from a specified source, being transmitted 
through a particular channel, and reaching a series of discrete individuals. 
This model probably fits the case involving low-salience issues fairly well, 
but the powerful determining effects of groups on attitudes involving. 
salient issues, is totally omitted from consideration. 
a truly stimulus-response one. 
1.22 The motivational anproach. 
The approach is 
This approach to the study of attitudes in general is 
derivi tive of psychoanalytic thinking. It is represented by the 
a~thoritarian personality study (Adorno et. al. 1950), and by Smith, 
Bruner and \fui te' s (1956) "Opinions and Personality". The only workers 
in this tradition who have made any significant contribution to the under-
standing of attitude change are Daniel Katz and his collaborators at 
Michigan University. In fact, to quite a large extent the approach is 
antagonistic to the idea of ch~~ge, since attitudes are viewed as serving 
some necessary function in the individual's (more-or-less stable) 
motivational system. For example, the notion of persuading an authorit-
arian to hold non-authoritarian attitudes is nonsensical. 
required is a complete restructuring of personality. 
What would be 
15. 
The contribution of Smith, Bruner and White (1956) was 
largely methodological. Since an attitude is seen as serving some specific 
function or functions in the individual's personality, it is disputed that 
attitudes are best investigated in an emotionally neutral setting. These 
workers have therefore developed a stress-interview technique of attitude 
assessment. 
Katz and Stotland (1959) and Sarnoff and Katz (1954) have 
grouped the functions >;rhich attitudes are alleged to perform for the 
personality according to their motivational bases, as follows : 
(a) The instrumental, adjustive or utilitarian function, upon 
which Bentham and the utilitarians constructed their model 
of man. A child develops a favourable attitude toward any 
segment of his environment which is associated with the 
satisfaction of his needs, and an unfavourable attitude 
toward one which thwarts or punishes him. 
attitudes are means, either of reaching a desired goal, or 
of avoiding an undesirable one. The most common examples 
found in adult personalities are those attitudes held in 
order to be accepted as a member of some positively-valued 
reference group. 
(b) The ego-defensive function, in which the person protects 
himself from having to acknowledge some basic facts about 
himself or the harsh realities of the external world. 
Rigid, moralistic attitudes, for examples, may serve the 
function of protecting an individual from an acknowledgement 
of his own sexual and aggressive impulses. 
(c) 
(d) 
The value-expressive function, in which the individual 
derives satisfaction from exercising his inherent drive for 
self-expression, self-realisation, or the like, and his 
need to establish his identity on matters which are central 
to him. Most authoritarian attitudes fall into this 
category. 
The Kno-vrledge function, based on the individual's need to 
giv~ structure to his universe. Stereotypes, as Walter 
Lippmann (1922) originally pointed out, '! ••. may not be 
a complete picture of the world, but they are a picture 
of a possible vrorld to which we are adapted". 
According to the theory, instrumental attitudes can be 
changed by changing a person's goals (e.g. reference groups), or by 
demonstrating to him that his goals are not best served by the attitudes 
which he holds. Value-expressive attitudes can be changed only by 
demonstrating to the individual a discrepancy between his values and 
his attitudes. Ego-defensive attitudes must be changed by-removing the 
real or imagined threat. This is usually impossible in practice, but 
there is an·alternative: the individual may be given insight into his own 
personality dynamics. Defensive attitudes flourish in a threatening 
atmosphere, so this is best accomplished in a relaxed, non-threatening 
setting. Finally, attitudes which serve the knowledge function can best 
be changed by exposing the individual .to a range of experience at variance 




The S-R and motivational approaches to attitude change are, 
in a sense, complementarY-. The motivational approach deals with strategy 
(theory) while the S-R approach is concerned with tactics and empirical 
details. 
It can readily be seen that the motivational approach concerns 
itself wholly with attitudes involving salient issues. It can not, therefore, 
I ' 
explain the conditioning of attitudes involving low-salience issues, which 
has been demonstrated to occur by those who have taken the S-R approach to 
its absurdist teleological conclusion (Razran, 1940; Doob, 1947; Lott, 
1955; Staats and Staats, 1956; Janis, Kaye and Kirschner, 1965; and 
Staats, 1967). 
Coupled with this fact is the partial recognition by 
representatives of the motivational approach, especially Sarnoff and 
Katz (1954); Smith, Bruner and White (1956); and Katz and Stotland (1959), 
of the importance of group factors in understanding attitude change. 
However, if judged by the criterion of heuristic value, the theory of 
Katz and his co-workers has proved disappointing. On the other ha:rld, 
Adorno's et. al. (1950) theory of authoritarianism, which is not of 
.. direct relevance to attitude change, has proved to be one of the most 
heuristic theories in the historyof social psychology._-
18. 
1.23 The perceptual/cognitive approach. 
Under this heading can be subsumed the models deriving from 
the concepts of balance, congruity and dissonance. The concept of balance 
is due-ultimately to Heider (1946), the congruity principle to Osgood and 
Tannenbaum (1955), and cognitive dissonance theory to Festinger (1957). 
Common to these formulations is the notion that thoughts, :beliefs, attitudes 
and behaviour tend to. organise themselves in meaningful .and sensible ways, 
into a state of cognitive/perceptual consistency (Feldman, 1966). However, 
the methods used by individuals to achieve consistency are often highly 
irrational (Zajonc, 1960). 
The original formalisation of the perceptual/cognitive 
approach de~ives from Fritz Heider's (1946) work on person perception. 
Heider focused his analysis on an individual's (P's) cognitive structure 
representing relations between himself, some other person (0), and some 
psychological object (X). P may perceive two kinds of relationships among 
the elements: liking (L), and unit relations (U), such as cause, possession 
and similarity. Each relationship may be positive or negative. 
An individual's cognitive structure, comprising these three 
elements and their relationships, may be balanced or unbalanced. An 
unbalanced state exists only if there is one negative and.two positives in 
the structure. For example, a state of balance would exist if P perceived 
that : P likes 0, 0 dislikes X, and P dislikes X. An unbalanced state 
might be P likes 0, 0 possesses X, P dislikes X. The fundamental 
·assumption is that an unbalanced state produces tension and generates forces 
to restore balance by changing one or more of the relationships. This 
assumption has received some empirical support (Jordan, 1953)o 
Cartwright and Harary (1956) have removed Heider's formulation 
onto a higher level of abstraction. Their generalisation allows any number 
of cognitive elements and relationships, and the degree of balance i.s given 
by the proportion of balanced cycles. Some empirical support for this 
extended model, similar to that cited for Heider's model, has been provided 
by Norrissette (1958). 
Another generalisation of Heider's model was advanced by 
Newcomb (1953), who extended the system from purely cognitive relations to 
power relations, leadership relations, and so on. Newcomb was the first 
worker in this tradition to examine the factors determining the degree of 
~'strain toward symmetry". In a situation in which P holds a different 
attitude toward X from a well~liked 0, this depends upon : the degree of 
the perceived discrepancy between the PX and OX relations, the degree of 
attraction of P toward 0, the salience of X for P, the degree .of P's 
certainty concerning O's orientation toward X, and the degree to which X 
is relevant to the AO relationship. An implication of this analysis 
. is that when an unbalanced state exists for P, various outcomes apart from 
change in attitude toward X or 0 are possible, however Newcomb offers no 
solution to the problem of predicting what changes will occur in a specified 
situation. Nevertheless, a variety of possible outcomes are taken into 
account in subsequent elaborations of the balance model, the most 
significant of which.is Abelson and Rosenberg's (1958) "symbolic 
psychologic". 
In 1954 Newcomb established a temporary residence in which 
seventeen students could live rent-free in return for offering themselves 
as subjects in a longi tiidinal experiment. The findings, which have been 
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replicated several times, were that those who were attracted to each other 
tended to agree on a wide range of (high salience) issues, and these 
similarities, real and perceived, increased over time. (Newcomb, 1956). 
These findings lend themselves readily to reinterpretation in terms of 
the value-information concept, since one would predict a desire to be 
positively evaluated by people to \<Thorn one is attracted; in an 
artifically mixed social group like Newcomb's, the subjects clearly have 
to choose their allegances. 
Further indirect evidence for the Heider-Newcomb balance 
model has been reported by Burdick and Burns (1958), who obtained 
significant increases in G.S.R. in unbalanced "real-life" situations, 
_in which the subjects disagreed with a well-liked experimenter. 
Undoubtedly Newcomb's greatest contribution was a demonstration 
that attitudes are not inherent properties of individual_personalities. 
Attitudes are not viewed as existing in social vacuums or intrapersonal 
settings (of. 1.21 above); but as constituting the cells in a social 
matrix. This conception implies_ a potential changeability in attitudes 
of high value-information content which has not been fully appreciated 
by researchers in other tradi tions_(Newcomb, 1961, 1963). 
1.231 The principle of congruity. 
This principle, which really amounts to a quantified method 
of describing perceptual/cognitive balance, was originally advanced by 
Osgood and Tannenbaum (1955). Heider's model had dealt with all-or-
nothing "pro" or "con" attitudes, and despite Newcomb's demur, there 
had before 1955 been no method in existence for taking into account the 
quantitative aspects of attitudes in the prediction of attitude change 
from consistency theories. 
Osgood and Tannenbaum's (1955) method of quantification is 
somewhat crude. A simple seven-point rating scale, derived from Osgood's 
(1952) semantic differential, is used to assess the degre~e of po.si tive or·· 
negative affect associated with the psychological object. Sophisticated 
···attitude scales are seldom used. 
The principle of congruity holds that lvhen attitude change 
occurs, it always occurs in the direction of increased congruity with the 
existing frame of reference. The paradigm is a situation in which Pis 
confronted by some other individual 0, toward whom P has some quantifiable 
attitude, and 0 proceeds to evaluate a psychological object X toward which 
P has a pre-existing attitude. Osgood and Tannenbaum (1955) provide a 
formula for predicting the attitude change (toward 0 and X) expected in 
this sort of situation. The formula states that the change in attitude 
toward the two congitive elements (0 and X) will be inversely proportional 
to their degree of polarisation on the seven-point rating scale, with a 
·correction for incredulity (in case Stokely Carmichael votes for Hubert 
Humphrey).· 
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Fishbein and Raven (1962), and Fishbein (1963) have 
distinguished be~qeen beliefs about a psychological object and attitude 
toward that object, and have offered operational definitions of belief and 
attitude using methods derivitive of Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957). 
Anderson and Fishbein (1965) have tested Fishbein's formula for attitude 
change, which takes into account the total amount of affect associated 
with each of the individual's beliefs about the object, in contrast with 
Osgood and Tannenbaum's (1955) original formula which uses the mean affect 
associated with an individual's beliefs (only one rating is made). The 
empirical support for each of these formulae is disappointingly slight 
(see Anderson and Fishbein, 1965). 
Considering the balance and congrui~ formulations together, 
it seems highly probable that the value-information content of attitudes 
is a determining factor of the amount of attitude change to be expected. 
The basic paradigm of both approaches is a situation-in which P perceives 
a liked or disliked 0 evaluating explicitly or implicitly a liked or 
disliked X. The assertion is that this can affect P's attitude toward 
-· 
0 and/or X. However no truly explanatory concept is offered to account 
for this effect. 
Suppose, for example, an extremely well-liked 0 is perceived 
by P to evaluate extremely unfavourably, the common psychological object 
X, and suppose further that P's initial rating of X was extremely favourable. 
Balance and congrui ~ formulations would predict that P' s attitude toward X 
will become less favourable, and similarly his attitude toward 0. However 
no real explanation for this prediction is offered, save a postulated drive 
for perceptual/cognitive consistency. 
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It has been suggested that the degree of "relevance" of X to 
the P - 0 relationship is a determining factor of amount of attitude change 
(see above). The value-information content of P's initial attitude toward 
X is a more precise notion 9 which has the advantages.of being measurable 
and affording some explanation of the predicted attitude change. By 
sticking to his initial attitude tov.1ard X, P perceives himself as a person 
who might be unfavourably evaluated by 0. By adopting an attitude less 
favourable than his initial attitude toward X, he may perceive himself as 
someone less likely to be negatively evaluated by 0. The extent to vThich 
these statements are valid is a simple function of the value-information 
content of P's initial attitude. 
In the real-life situation, the potential audience of an 
expressed attitude is usually much larger than one. Thus the possibility of 
P's changing his attitude toward 0 rather than (or as well as) X seldom 
arises. In some circumstances, however, P may react in this ivay ("I don't 
care what 0 would think of me because I don't like him".). Here again any 
change will be determined by the value~information content of P's initial 
attitude. But it must be stressed that the balance/congruity formulations 
are slightly artificial in abstracting one element out of the individual's 
total social environments. 
1.232 Cognitive dissonance theory. 
This theory, originally put forward by Leon Festinger (1957) 
states that two cognitions 11 ••• are in a dissonant relation if, considering 
these two alone, the obverse of·one element would follow from the other" 
(p.l3). Of all the cognitive/perceptual models, this one has generated the 
greatest volume of research on attitude change. 
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The basic assumption of dissonance theory is that dissonance, 
11 
••• being psychqlogically uncomfortable, will motivate the person to try 
to reduce dissonance" and ti • • • in addition to trying to reduce it, the 
person will actively avoid situations and information which would likely 
increase the dissonance" (:Festinger, 1957~ p.3.). 
There are a number of possible modes of dissonance reduction 
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in most situations. In'general, the individual may decrease the number 
and/or importance of the dissonant elements, change one or more of the 
elements, or add new elements. Attitude change is often only one of several 
alternative methods of reducing dissonance in a dissonance-arousing situation 
(Cohen, 1964). Furthermore, dissonance is a quantitative concept : the 
amount of dissonance aroused by a given situation is a function of the ratio 
of dissonant to consonant cognitions, with each element weighted for its 
"importance 11 to the individual. 
The burgeoning literature on cognitive dissonance has been 
reviewed by Asch (1958), Mowrer (1963)P Jordan (1964), Chapanis and 
Chapanis (1964), Weick (1965), Bem (1967), Rhine (1967), and Elms (1967). 
The reviews of Mowrer, Jordan, Chapanis and Chapanis, Bem and Elms can be 
viewed as critiques, but impressive rejoinders have been written by · 
Zimbardo (1964), Silverman (1964), Brehm (1965)and Mills (1967). 
The three types of dissonance-arousing situations on which 
most research has been done involve post-decision situations, forced 
compliance situations, and situations in which the individual is confronted 
with dissonance-arousing communications (The classic attitude-change situations 
studied by workers following the S-R approach). 
.. -· . 
Cognitive dissonance theory predicts dissonance following 
decision, or commitment to an alternative, to the extent that the chosen 
alternative contains unattractive features and the nonchosen alternative 
attractive features to the chooser. Empirical support has been obtained 
for the deduced hypotheses that post-decision dissonance will lead to 
selective self-exposure to information supporting the decision, and that 
following decision the chosen alternative will become more attractive to 
the chooser and the nonchosen alternative less attractive. (Brehm, 1956, 
1959, 1960; Ehrlich et. al., 1957; Mills, Aronson and Robinson, 1959; 
Adams, 1961; Rhine, 1967), although the results are somewhat equivocal. 
vlhen an individual is forced (either by reward or punishment) 
to commit himself publicly to an attitudinal position which differs from 
his initial attitude, dissonance theory predicts greater attitude change 
in the direction of the commitment the less the reward or punishment. 
This prediction is opposite to the prediction derivable from .behaviour 
theory. Data collected by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) and by Aronson 
and Mills (1959), support the dissonance point of view, although, needless 
to say, these experiments have aroused some controversy with workers 
adhering to the S-R approach •. 
In situations involving exposure of individuals to information 
discrepant with their prior attitudes, cognitive dissonance theory predicts 
attitude change, the amount of change depending upon such factors as the 
salience of the issue, the amount of effort expended in receiving the . 
communication, and the subjectively felt freedom to have avoided the 
communication. These effects are well documented (Cohen, 1959; Cohen, 
; .- . . ' . 
1,.,·, ... 
Terry, and Jones~ ~5S; Brehm, 1960: and Zimbardo, 1960) • 
. '. ·~: . 
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1.24 Overview 
In his acceptance address upon receiving an award for 
distinguished contribution to science, Heider (1967) implicitly drew 
attention to the distinguishing characteristic of the perceptual/cognitive 
approach to attitude change, which clearly illustrates its Gestalt roots. 
Using Ross Ashby's terminology, he distinguished between man's nonsocial 
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environment, which he described as poorly joined, and his social environment, 
which is richly joined. The perceptual/cognitive approach takes full 
cognisance of the essential interrelatedness of social cognitions. 
Attitudes are viewed as existing in an interpersonal setting, and a change 
in any part of the perceptual/cognitive system may affect a given attitude. 
The value-information content of attitudes is a parameter 
which has not really been implicitly or explicitly considered. The S-R, 
. . 
motivational, and cognitive/perceptual approaches have been dealt with here. 
in ascending rank order of the extent to which the approaches imply applic-
ability to attitudes of high value-information content. This is found to 
correspond to the descending rank order of applicability of "standard" 
persuasive communications, which is to be expected if the analysis of value-
information content in 1.1 above has any validity. 
Fundamental attitude change on salient issues is undoubtedly 
a phenomenon frequently found in "real-life" situations (Lifton, 1968)~ 
Yet this phenomenon has seldom been demonstrated in research on attitude 
change. This may be because, in research following the S-R tradition, the 
factors of change in the social psychological environments of the subjects 
have not been manipulated, and in research following more socially oriented 
approaches, manipulation of the social psychological environments of the 
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subjects have not been manipulated, and in research follo1:ing more socially 
oriented approaches, maaipulation of tho social psyehological environments 
of the subjects has usually been restricted to manipulating one element, 
or the attitude of one significant other. · At some level of consciousness, 
subjects bring knowledge of their whole environments into the experimental 
situations. 
There is evidence that "overheard 11 communications are more 
powerful in effecting attitude change t~an communications which appear to 
the subjects to be specifically directed at them (vlalster and Festinger, 
1962; Brock and Becker, 1965), although the second study failed t~ find 
equal effects with counterpropaganda. This is the closest any research has 
come to investigating attitude change in response to the indirect pressure 
of social norms. However, there is reason to suppose that such pressures 
are more capable of accounting for fundamental attitude change of attitudes 
of high value-information content than direct persuasive communications· 
emanating from a specified source, or even overheard communications from 
conversations between two people. In vie\'! of this, the overlap between 
research on conformity and research on attitude change is surprisingly 
sligh~. 
1,3 The present study 
It has been shown that the value-information content of an 
attitude is given by 
Hv m -log E X ~ 
For the producer of an attitude, Hv represents the extent to 
which he expects to be favourably or unfavourably evaluated by others as a 
result of possessing the attitude. It has been deduced from this that 
attitudes of high~ are highly susceptible to change through pressure from 
diverse social norms. 
The present study is an attempt 
(a) to test this deduction empirically; 
(b) to provide a laboratory analogue illustrating the perpetuation of 
divergent attitu~inal norms in social groups; and 
(c) to investigate some of the personalit.Y variables which may be related 
to attitude change involving high-Hv attitudes. 
The first necessity was to create an experimental group 
situation in which the subjects infer their initial attitudes on some issue 
to contain considerable value-information, and in which the experimenter is 
able to manipulate the attitudinal norm. Since high Hv implies high.§. and 
low P, it was necessary to ensure that the issue was salient and the 
subjects' attitudes improbable. 
In order to ensure. ,high salience, the attitude-issue chosen 
for use in this study was attitudes toward Africans. There is hardly an 
issue more salient in the population of students from which the samples were 
drawn. It is even true to say that sociometric choices within the student 
population are associated to a noticeably large extent with assumed similar-
ities or dissimilarities in attitude toward Africans. Thus, although ]! 
was not measured for each subject, it can safely be assumed that the issue 
was perceived as a salient one by all the subjects. 
The other variable determining Hv is the inferred probability 
of the subject's attitude. Since the objective probabilit,y of attitudes 
toward Africans in the population is not open to manipulation by the 
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experimenter, it was decided to create laboratory "microcul tures" in which 
the subjects were misled concerning the probabilities of their attitudes. 
More specifically, the initial subjects were placed in an 
Asch-type situation, in which they were confronted by a unanimous majority 
of group members (actually confederates of the experimenter) who ~xpressed 
a monolithic extreme attitude toward Africans (either extremely favourable 
or extremely unfavourabie). Each group member responded orally with 
agreement or disagreement to an inventory of statements about Africans, 
the initial naive subjects.responding last to each statement. Except in 
29. 
the unlikely .. case where the naive subject agrees with the unanimous 
majority of confederates' respon~es to every statement, he is led to lj)elieve 
that his pre-existing attitude is highly improbable, at least within the 
microculture. It follows, since the issue has been selected for its 
salience, that~ is high for th~ subjects' initial attitudes. 
I' . 
The attempt to provide a laboratory analogue of the 
perpetuation of norms in social iroups was inspired by Sherif's (1936) 
classic experiments on norm formation, Rose and Felton 1 s (1955) ''experimental 
histories of culture"; Gerard, Kluckhohn and Rapoport's.(l956) studies of 
the evolution of "microcul tures"; and Jacobs and Campbell's (1961) 
experiments 'on the perpetuation of arbitrary traditions in laboratory 
microcul tures. 
Rose and Felton (1955) originally attempted to demonstrate 
the perpetuation of norms which transcend the replacement of individual 
members of the group. In Rose and Felton's study, group interpretations . . . . . . . 
of Rorschach cards were used, the Gerard, Kluckhohn and Rapoport (1956) 
study used instances of a difficult puzzle series, and in the Jacobe and 
Campbell (1961) experiments, the original autokinetic effect used by 
Sherif (1936) was demonstrated. 
us~s 
The present study .w&& high-1!!, attitudes. 
Once the extreme attitudinal norm has been established in 
each group, the confederates are removed one by one and replaced by 
naive subjects, the hypothesis being that the naive subjects will become 
the unwitting transmitters of the extreme norm to each new generation. 
That is to say, as each new group member responds to the pressure of the 
extreme attitudinal norm by changing his attitude in the direction of 
conformity with it, so he in turn becomes a bearer of the norm and helps 
to place pressure on the next subject to enter the group. 
There are two experimental conditions. In _one conditi9n 
the confederates establish a norm extremely favourable toward Africans, 
· while in the other a norm extremely unfavourable toward Africans is 
inculcated. The assumption is that the first condition will lead to 
attitude change on the part of the subjects in the direction of a more 
favourable attitude toward African~, and vice-versa in the second condition, 
and furthermore that these changes will continue to be observed in successive 
·generations as the confederates are removed and replaced by naive subjects • . . 
This assumption is a reasonable one if the literature on conformity has any 
applicability and if the analysis of the value~information content of 
attitudes is valid. 
Comparatively low correlations have been obtained between 
attitudes toward Africans and authoritarianism among South African university 
students (e.g. van den Berghe, 1962), although authoritarianism does appear 
to account for some small part of the variance in attitude scores. This 
is t.o .be expected in view of the high salience of the issues attitudes 
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toward Africans among South African universit,y students can be expected to 
depend to a very large extent upon n.ormative .pressures. van den Berghe 
has commented on the low correlation between "race attitudes" and author-
itarianism: 
"In a •••••••• country like South Africa, the social pressure 
toward colour prejudice is such that it will be found among people who have 
no personalit,y dispositi<?n to it at all". (van den Berghe, 1962, p. 63) •. 
It nevertheless remains necessary to account for individual 
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differences. These differences are no doubt partly a result of the different 
" 
social pressures to which different individuals are subjected. It is the. 
I 
main aim of this study to investigate the extent to which attitudes to~ard 
i 
Africans are subject to modification through the pressure of social norms. 
However individual differences in attitudes tow~ Africans may be related 
to personalit,y variables apart from authoritarianism. To be more specific, 
if there are personality variables predictive of conformity, then one 
might expect these variables to be predictive of attitude toward Africans 
given knowledge of the normative pressures operating on the individuals. 
The general failure to find any sovereign personality traits associated 
with attitude toward Africans in South Africa is reminiscent of the 
prolonged search in the 1920s and '1930s for the general traits of leaders. 
In the latter case it was eventually,appreciated that situational factors 
are at least as important in understanding leadership as ~rsopality traits 
(see e.g. Gouldner, 1950). · The present study is a move in the same 
direction for attitudes. 
Unfortunately the search for·personality variables associated 
with conformity has not been altogether successful either. In a recent 
review, Hollander and Willis· (1967) suggest that in general,· personality 
factors interact with situational factors in predicting conformit,y. Thus 
the position is very complex. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to 
suppose that, holding the situation constant in the laboratory, it may be 
possible to isolate personality variables which interact with the 
experimental treatments to predict final attitude toward Africans. These 
variables will be the ones which are predictive of conformit,y in the type 
of situation created by ~he experimental set-up. 
In the hope of finding such interactions, the following 




Authoritarianism, which is expected to be no more or less 
predictive of attitude toward Africans than in previous 
studies, but is expected nevertheless to account for some 
of the variance. If authoritarianism is related to 
conformity in the type of situation created in.the 
laboratory, it may in addition interact with the experimental 
treatments in predicting final attitude. 
Independence of judgment, which has been demonstrated to 
be highly predictive of independence in an Asch-type 
situation similar to the ones used in this study (Barron, 
1968). 
Self-esteem, which is known to be related to attitude change 
in the more general sense (see 1.21 above).~ This variable and 
variable (b) may be predictive of attitude change.given know-
ledge of the normative pressure to which the subject is 
. 
subjected: they may interact with the experimental treatments 
{favourable and unfavourable norms) in predicting post-change 
favourableness toward Africans· in the subjects. 
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2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Probably the most widely applicable serious criticism that 
can be levelled against research on attitude change to date concerns the 
extent to which the attitude change achieved in the laboratory resembles 
attitude change in a naturalistic setting. The experimental situations 
are usually artificial -and contrived, thus severely limiting the 
"external validity" (Campbell and Stanley, 1963) or "generality"-
(Sidman, 1960) of the findings. 
.-
However, more realistic experiments raise a plethora of 
design problems. Firstly, the problems of experimental manipulation are 
usually enlarged. Secondly, problems of experimental control tend to 
become intractable, thereby placing a query over the internal validity of 
the findings. Finally,. designs in~olving the use of subjects prior to 
obtaining their consent violate the ethical injunctions laid down by the 
A.P.A. 
A laboratory study of attitude change should usually'be 
designed so as to provide as close an analogue.of "real-life" attitude 
change as possible, bearing these difficulties in mind. Pre-post test 
designs are generally quite unsuitable for research in this area. There 
now exists a vast amount of evidence concerning the powerful effects on 
subjects of the demand characteristics of experimental situations (e.g. · 
Orne, 1962). Even the most artless subject knows if he is tested twice, 
that he is expected by. the experimenter to. display attitude change, and 
the nature of the experimental manipulation can barely leave any doubt 
~s_to_th~ direction of the des~red change. The results of a great pro-
portion of laboratory studies of attitude change can be accounted for by 
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such demand characteristics as well as by the hypotheses under invest-
igation. The mere repetition of a measure may account for the results 
as well as does the manipulation of the independent variable. 
Clearly the first requisite for drawing any conclusions 
about the effect of the experimental manipulation is that one has an 
opportunit,y to observe the outcome of both a manipulation and a non-
manipulation condition •. It is fqr this reason that a pre-post test 
design with a control group is very often used •. However more sophisticated 
researchers, in order to control fo~ the effects of mere repetition of the 
measure, sometimes include two f~ther control groups, yielding a design 
which has become known as the Solomon four-group design (Solomon, 1949): 
Group I pretest manipulation post test 
Group II pretest post test 
Group III manipulation. posttest 
Group IV post test 
This is a very exact design, but it is also very exacting. 
It provides information about the effect of the manipulation, the effect 
of. pretesting, and the effect of the interaction of pretesting with 
experimental manipulation, but twice as many subjects are required. 
What is not always fully appreciated is that much of the 
information provided by the Solomon four-group design is r~dundant. 
Researchers in the field of attitude change are seldom concerned with 
investigating the effects of pretesting or repetition of the measure. 
These effects can be perfectly adequately eliminated (though not 
measured of course) by the design reco~ended in a different connection by 




manipulation post test 
posttest. 
Campbell and Stanley are quick to suggest that there is 
likely to be some reluctance to ~ive up the pretest because it establishes 
that the experimental and control groups were really equivalent. It may 
require a conscious effort of will, however, to remember that it is random 
assignment of subjects to the two groups, not pretesting, that is likely to . 
ensure equivalence in a randomised groups design. When matching is un- · 
feasible (as it often is in the field of attitude change), this design 
might be the most useful. 
For the present experiment, a modification of the Campbell-




manipulation P posttest 
manipulation· A· ·posttest · 
post test. 
P and A refer to manipulations .which are intended to have 
opposite effects on.the posttest results. ·Their inclusion enormous~ 
. increases the power of the design. Manipulation P refers to the exposure 
··of the subjects to social pressure designed to render their attitudes more 
favourable toward Africans (more pro-African) while manipulation A is 
intended to render the subjects• attitudes less favourable toward Africans 
(more anti-African) through exposur~ to an anti-African norm. 
The manner of posttesting differed slightly between the 
experimental and control condi tiona. In the experimental groups, the 
subjects responded orally to items on an attitude scale, while the subjects 
... 
in the control group responded in writing on an individual basis. However 
the design allows for an investigation of the effects of the two methods of 
posttesting (irrespective of manipulatiop) by a comparison of groups I and 
II with group III. 
Furthermore the initial subjects in each experimental group 
are exposed to normative pressure which is directly controlled by the 
experimenter, while subjects entering the group at subsequent generations 
are exposed to increasingly indirect pressure. This may result in the 
subjects being exposed to decreasingly powerful pressure, and therefore 
I ' /l 1 
less attitude change may be expected in subjects entering the group in 
1' 1 r 
later generations than the change expected in the initial subjects. The 
data in the present study are collected in such a way as to enable .. 
comparisons between the groups separately at each generation in addition 
· · to the gross overall comparison of. the mean attitude scores of the three 
groups. 
Finally a word has to be said about the manner of invest-
igating the effect of personality variables on attitude change in the two 
experimental groups. The personality variables were manipulated post hoc 
,, 
.bY selection of subgroups from the experimental subject pool. In order 
.to be able to examine the effects of these variables on attitudes toward 
Africans and on attitude change, the subjects in the experimental gro~ps 
were arranged in three 3 x 2 factorial designs, comprising 3 random levels 
on each personality measure x 2 experimental conditions. The posttest 
attitude scale scores are the dependent variable. Those personality variables 
which are predictive of conformity may be expected to interact with the 
experimental condition in predicting poettest attitude. 
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2.1 Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 : 
Hypothesis 2 : 
Hypothesis 3 : 
Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 5 
Subjects in condition P will become significantly 
more favourable in their attitudes toward Africans, 
and subjects in condition A will become significantly 
less favourable. 
The amount of attitude change displayed by the 
subjects will decline over successive generations 
of the microculture. 
Independence of judgment will interact with the 
experimental treatments in predicting attitude, 
independent subjects being less influenced by the 
normative pressure than yielding subjects. 
Self-esteem will interact with the experimental 
treatments in predicting attitude, subjects of 
low self-esteem being more influenced by the 
normative pressure than subjects of high self-
esteem. 
Authoritarianism will be negatively related to 
favourableness toward Africans irrespective of 
the experimental treatment. 
3. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ATTITUDE SCALE 
A truly powerful scale for measuring attitudes toward Africans 
among-University of Cape ... Town students should possess all the following 







It should ~ standardised on a sample drawn from the same 
population as the population on which it is to be used; 
It should be unidimensional, measuring only attitudes 
toward Africans; 
It should generate a wide range of scores; 
It should possess a wide diversity of item content, i.e.,_ 
its unidimensionality should not result from the fact 
that it merely contains rephrasings of the same statement. 
It should be corrected as far as possible for response 
sets and styles; an~ 
It should be reliable and valid. 
In order to satisfy condition (a) it was decided to develop 
and standardise the scale on a sample of University of Cape Town students. 
To meet criterion (b) Guttman's (1944, 1947) scalogram analysis techn~que 
suggests itself. However this technique does not guarantee criteria (c) 
and (d), two characteristics of attitude scales which are best achieved by 
using Thurstone's (1929, 1931) equal-appearing interval judgment technique. 
This. latter technique has, however itself suffered severe criticism on 
various grounds, one of which is that there is no criterion on which to. 
select the most discriminating items. 
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Likert's (1932) summated rating technique ensures that only 
. . ..... .. 
the most discriminating items are include-d in the scale. However the 
reliability and validity of Likert scales tend usually to be even lower 
than those of Thurstone scales (see Edwards, 1957a). 
The method finally decided upon was the scale-discrimination 
technique of Edwards and Kilpatrick (1948, Edwards, 1957a) • This synthesis 
of several procedures yields a method of attitude scaling which retains all. 
the advantages, and· obviates most 'of the disadvantages of Thurstone, Likert 
and Guttman scales. Unidimensionality. discriminating power, item diversity, 
l ., 
a wide range of scores and reliability are all guaranteed. The technique 
,. \ 
' is naturally not economical in time and energy. 
3.1 Selection of items 
In general, psychologists tend to be vague about the sources 
from which they obtain statements as raw material for developing attitude 
inventories. Some are probably written by the investigators, while others ,, 
. are obtained from newspaper artiqles, books and magazines relating to the 
psychological object. Such item~ can be criticised on the grounds that 
they do not always represent suf~i1iently common and currently-held opinions. 
The investigator's horse-sense t~u~ sets an upper limit to the usefulness of 
the scale. 
The source from which all the inventory statements used in 
the present study were drawn, was a series of protocols of. small-group 
discussions among first-year psychology students at various South African 
universities, stimulated by a controversial tape-recorded political speech. 
The statements elicited from these group discussions had been carefully 
- . 
~dited for p~poees of an undergraduate research project at the University 
of Cape Town9 (Callias, 1963). 
39. 
One hundred evaluative statements referring to Africans were 
selected from these protocols according to_the informal criteria for 
selecting attitude scale statements which have been set out by Wang (1932). 
Likert (1932) and Edwards (1957a). Some of the statements were slightly 
rephrased : wherever the words "non-White",. "native", 1'non-European", 
"Bantu", etc., appearea, the word "African" was substituted, since these 
words are themselves attitude-expressive~ It was felt desirable to hold 
the value-loading of the word constant, and to ensure that the psychological 
object is unambiguously implied by the items in the scale. 
3.2 Scale and Q values 
Each statement was printed on a card, and the cards were 
arranged in bundles containing the hundred statements in random order 
together with eleven cards numbered 1 to 11. 
The bundles were distributed among a judging group of second-
year psychology students at the Universi~ of Cape Town, who were requested 
to spread the numbered cards out in front of them, with No. 1 at the. 
extreme left and No. 11 at the extreme right. On card No. 6. they were 
asked to write "neutral". 
This judging group was then requested to sort the b~dred 
statements into eleven piles, from the least favourable toward Africans 
on the left to the most favourable toward Africans on the right, ~ith pile 
No. 6. containing statements judged to be neutral toward Africans. 
Inevitably, several judges responded with their own agreement 
or disagreement with the statementsv instead of the degree of favourableness 
40. 
toward·Africans which the statements expre'ssed. In an effort to detect this, 
1•00 
two statements which seemed prima facie to the experimenter to be most 
unfavourable toward Africans, and. two which seemed to be most favourable 
were selected, and any arrangement by a member of the judging group which 
placed any of these statements in one of the middle five categories was 
discarded arbitrarily. Furthermore, following the traditional procedure 
in constructing Thuratone scales, any arrangement which placed 30 or more 
statements in one category was discarded on the assumption that the judge 
was careless or lazy. The responses of 50 judges remained, and from these 
responses scale and Q values were calculated. Research by Nystrom (1933), 
Uhrbrock (1934), Rosander (1936) ~. ~erguson (1939) and Edwards and Kenny 
(1946) indicates that reliable v~lqes can be obtained using a judging group 
as small as this. •: 
A typical cumulative proportion graph obtained for one of the 
·:. 
statements is shown in Fig. 2. 
[: 
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3.3 Summated rating responses 
The 45 statements obtaining the highest Q values {i.e., those-
eta tements found most "ambiguous" by the judging group) were discarded, and 
the remaining 55 statements we!e retained for Likert scaling. 
These statements were printed in the form of an inventory 
with four forcing respo~se categories : "strongly disagree"; "disagree"; 
"agree"; "strongly agree" after each item. The omission of a neutral 
response category was decided upon in the light of evidence that it makes 
lazy responses more difficult and minimises "evasiveness" (of. Levinson's 
discussion in Adorno et. al., 1950). 
The response categories were weighted 0 through 3 such that 
3 always indicated the response most favourable toward Africans. The 
direction of the weighting (which can be ambiguous in statements approaching 
neutrali~ on the Thurstone continuum) was not decided upon arbitrarily as 
is customary in constructing Like~t scales, but was determined by the 
position of the statements on the, Thurstone continuum. 
The summated rating scale was distributed among a group of 
. ' 
students enrolled for the introductory course in psychology at the Univerai~ 
of Cape Town, and a score was obtained for each respondent by summing his 
scores for·each item. 
Once again the returns were scrutinised for any obviously 
careless or facetious responses. Such returns, together with those in which 
,items were omitted, were discarded, leaving 165 ~eturns for item analysis. 
3·4 Item analysis, 
The top 25 percent and bottom 25 percent of respondents (in 
terms of their total Likert scores ) were identified as the "High" and "tow" 
groups. For each statemen~ a distribution was obtained showing the frequency 
of responses in each response category for the High and Low groups. A 














The response categories were dichotomised as illustrated by 
drawing a horizontal line so as to' minimise the total number of responses 
in the Low group above the line and maximise the number of responses in 
the High group above the line. New weights of 0 and 1 were assigned to 
each statement following the dichoto~. The four forcing response 
categories were retained, but they were interpreted dichotomously in 
subsequent analyses. The pht coefficients of the statements scored in 
this way were determined from Guilford's·(l941) nomographs in order to 
avoid tedious computations •. 
3.5 Scalogram analysis 
The 55 statements were then ranked in ascending order of their 
Thurstone scale values. 28 statements with relatively high phi coefficients 
(representing high discriminating power or validity) were selected, ensuring, 
however, that a wide range of Thurstone scale values vas represented in the· 
items selected. Two fo~ of the scale (A and B) were then prepared by 
assigning items with alternate scale values to either form. 
Instead of obtaining responses from a fresh group of respondents 
for purposes of scalogram analysis, the responses of 100 of the 165 respondents 
used in the summated rating procedure were randomly chosen, and their responses 
were re-scored using the new dichotomised response weights. 
Applying scalogram analysis to each form separately, co-
efficients of reproducibility of •762 and o762 were obtained. After 
removing the two items from each form which accounted for most of the 
error, Reps. were increased to •825 for form A, and •864 for form B. 
The two equivalent forms of the resulting sc.ale are given 
below, with lines drawn for each statement under the set of response categories 
which is scored 1. All other responses are scored o. 
• 
FORM A 
1. .The Africans should be liberated now. 
2. The Africans are not capable of being 
educated or civilised. 
3. Africans are still essentially barbarians. 
4. Africans are not fit for the opportunities 
given to Europeans. 
6. 
Trying to educate the African only results 
in uprisings and clashes. 
Africans are uncivilised. 
7. If the Africans enjoyed better environmental 
conditions, in time they would have as many 
prominent people as Whites have •. 
a. Africans enjoy their low standard of living. 
9o Africans are slovenly, dirty, and not house-
proud. 
10. The African is basically pea~e-loving, but 
the government's racial policy incites him 
to violence. 
11. Africans would not be able to appreciate their 
rights if we had complete democracy. 
12. It will take years before we can give the 












































1. If the Africans absorb the Europeans, 
civilisation will flourish. 
2. The African is ignorant and savage. 
Africans are not ready for freedom yet. 
4. Africans are quite happy to live in 
absolutely disgraceful conditions. 
5. 
6. 
The African is essentially lazy. 
Intermarriage with Africans would degrade 
the White race. 
7. Africans should gradually be given more and 
more say in the government. 
a. Africans are on a par with Whites. 
9. The Africans are several decades behind the 
Europeans in moral development. 




Educated Africans are as good as Whites. 













































~.6 Properties of the scale 
The scale consists of two equivalent forms containing twelve statements 
each. The response to each statement is scored 1 or 0, giving the scale as a 
whole a range of scores from 1 to 24. None of the statements in the scale is 
ambiguous. 
The statements_are taken from widely divergent pointe on the Thurstone 
continuum. They therefore represent both favourable and unfavourable opinions 
concerning Africans. This ensures that the scale is corrected for-acquiescence 
response set (Edwards, 1957b), and that it does not contain simple rephrasinge 
of the same opinion. 
·-
_Response sets such as "extremeness" and "evasiveness" (Fredericksen-
and Messick, 1959), are probably minimised by the use of four forcing response 
categories with neutral responses forbidden. 
The coefficients of reproducibility of the two forma (•864 and •825) 
··.give. the sca1e as a whole a Rep. of about •85, web implies that the scale 
is satisfactorily unid·imensional. Green (1954). has pointed out that the 
value of Rep. must be considered in conjunction with the mean of the modal 
response categories in making inferences about dimensionality. The mean of 
the modal response categories in the present scale. is-· •67, which is fairly . 
low. (The range of modal response categories is •51 - •79 for form A 
and •51 - •84 for form B.). We can infer, therefore_, that this scale 
is largely unidimensional. 
The phi coefficients in Form A range from •51 - •73 with a mean 
of •65; in form B the range is •54 - ·83 with a mean of ·69. Thus 
the scale as a whole has a mean phi coefficient of ·67 indicating that 
the discriminating power is ~xtremely high. This is a most encouraging 
figure, especially when one notes that Edwards and Kilpatrick (1948) did 
not originally attain such a high discriminating power for their scale. 
Evidence for the equivalent-form reliability of the scale is available 
in unpublished undergraduate research projects at the University of Cape Town. 
Reanalysing correlations between the two forms by applying the Brown-Spearman 
formula (see McNemar, 1949), figures ranging from •88 to •95 are obtained. 
(The Brown-Spearman fo~ula gives the reliability of the whole test as twice 
the correlation between the halves divided by one plus the correlation 
between the halves). 
Finally, concerning the v.alidi ty of the scale, no direct evidence 
is available, unless one accepts Guilford's interpretation of the mean phi 
coefficient (in this case ·67) ··as equivalent to actuarial validity. 
'· 
However this figure and the Rep. = •85, imply when considered together 
that the scale measures some attitude validly. Perhaps a measure of 
I 





The .§.s who took part in this experiment were 226 students at the 
Universit,y of Cape Town. Completely random selection of Sa and assignment 
to conditions was not feasible, but care was taken to avoid as far as possible 
any systemat~c bias in selection and assignment of .§.a to condi tiona. 
The control group comprised 166 students enrolled for the introductory 
course in psychology. The experimental groups P and A consisted of 30 un-
selected .§.a each. The experimental .§.s were recruited in groups of 7 or 9 by 
simply approaching strangers on the campus and asking them to volunteer as 
subjects. Those doing the recruiting made sure that they approached only 
total strangers, and the potential volunteers were told simply that the 
experiment involved attitudes. 
4.2 Instruments 
The dependent variable was measured by means of the attitude scale 
described in chapter 3. The independent variables under considerati.on were 
firstly the experimental treatment (P, A or Control) which was manipulated by 
assigning subjects to different condi tiona, and secondly three different 
personality variables : self-esteem, authoritarianism and independence of 
''' 
judgment. 
Self-esteem was measured by means of a specially constructed scale to 
-·· -· ---
measure self-ideal discrepancy. This scale is similar to the Self and Ideal 
Q sorts used by Rogers and Dymond (1954) to evaluate the progress of psycho-
therapy, but' it is presented in a form more closely resembling the Semantic 
' ' 
Differential of Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum (1957). The scale is ·given iii .. 
Appendix A. 
The scale consists of twent,y-two bipolar adjective pairs 
selected from a thesaurtis, each pair being sepa~atea by a seven-point rating 
scale. In order that the operational definition of self-esteem should 
reflect the common-sense notion of the term as closely as possible, twent.y-
two strongly evaluative high-frequency word-pairs were chosen. 
Each~ was required to respond to the scale twice, indicating firstly 
the degree to which the adjectives apply to himself, and secondly the degree 
50. 
to which they apply to his ideal self. The measure of correspondence chosen 
was the Q score (Osgood and Suci, 1952). The~ score is actually a measure 
of lack of correspondence between the two sets of responses (i.e. discrepancy), 
a high score indicating low agreement. It was computed by finding the dis-
crepancy between the two responses on each bipolar adjective pair, squaring 
·\ . 
these diacrepanoies, summing the squares, and extracting the square root of 
this sum. 
Authoritarianism was measured by means of a forced-choice F scale, 
constructed along the lines laid down by Strickland and Janicki (1965) and 
Bryne and Bounds (1964). It consists of 15 items, each item comprising 
one F-posi tive statement and one Christie and Garcia (1951) reve_rsal, the 
two being separated by a six-point rating scale (see Appendix B). The F-
positive statements are all from Adorno et. alo (1950, Pp. 250- 257), 
except two which are from Christie and Garcia (1951, p. 464) •. The reversals 
are all from Christie and Garcia, p. 150, and they include the five that 
Byrne and Bounds found to be most reliable. The scale was scored in the 
normal way, each item being assigned a score of 1 through 7, with the 
absent mid-point or neutral response being scored 4 (§.s are free to omit. 
any items they are unable to decide upon). The scores are then summed, 
yielding a minimum of 15 and a maximum of 105. 
There is at the moment a lively controversy in the literature 
concerning the effect of acquiescence response set on scores obtained from 
the original California F scale (see, e.g. Rorer, 1965, Peabody, 1966), 
Samelson and Yates, 1967 and Guilford, 1967). The techniques of counter-
balancing (Byrne .and Bounds, 1964) and the forced-choice format (Berkowitz 
and Wolkon, 1964), which are used in the present scale, were developed in 
order to correct for acquiescence and also to make narrower interpretation 
of the scores possible. The investigations of Dustin and Davis (1967) and 
Sheffield and Byrne (1967) have ensured that meaningful results can be 
obtained in this way. 
51. 
Without wishing to enter the controversy, it is necessary to point out 
that, in the present study, it is highly desirable to be able to interpret 
the F scores free of acquiescence. If a relationship is found between 
authoritarianism and attitude change, for example, it would not be very 
interesting if it could be explained by the acquiescence factor in the F 
scale. While recognising that conformity is one of the alleged character-
istics of authoritarian personalities (although Weiner and McGinnies, . 1961, 
failed to find empirical evidence for the relationship), it was felt 
desirable to eliminate acquiescence response set from the measure of 
authoritarianism. For these reasons the forced-choice F scale described 
above was developed for use in this study. 
Independence of judgment was measured by means of the Independence 
of Judgment Scale (Barron, 1968) which is given in Appendix C. This scale 
was developed by Barron specificall~, in order to discriminate between 
~dependent .§.s and yielding .§.s in an Asch-·type situation like the one used 
in· the present study. The i tams were culled from such sources as Murray's 
"Explorations in Personality" (Mlirray, 1938), the E, F and PeC sc~es of 
. . 
the California Public Opinion Study (Adorno et. al., 1950), and scales 
developed at the Institute for Personalit,y and Research to measure such 
variables as "originality" and "personal soundness". 
For the purposes of the present experiment, only those items which 
discriminated at the 1 per cent level between independents and yielders 
were used. As in the original Barron-Asch study (Barron, 1968), each item 
is followed by two response categories, (True, False), :and each response 
;· 
is scored, 1 or 0 according to whether the response is in,'an independent or 
( ' 
yielding direction respectively. These scores are summed to give a total 
score for each~. ~high score thus indicates independence of judgment. 
, .. 
· 4.3 Treatments 
All Ss were posttested by being asked to respond with their own 
- {! 
opinions to the attitude scale described in chapter 3. However the nature 
I• 
of the experimental manipulations de~ded a slightly different mode of 
r : •• 
response in the experimental conditions from that in the control condition. 
The control ~s were required to fill in the questionnaire individually and 
in writing, giving their names at the top of the page, whereas the experi-
mental .§.s in,.both the, P and A cond~ t~ons responded orally in a group 
situation while the experimenter noted their responses. 
4.31 Experimental manipulations 
The first two experimental groups P(O) and A(O) consisted of 9 Ss 
each. The 9 ~s arrived at the experimental room and joined with 4 
confedera tea of the experimenter in each ca.se. The ~s were led to believe 




. After an initial check that none of the .§.s knew each other or any of 
the confederates, each.§. was assigned a number and assured anonymit.y. The 
experimenter then requested the five people who arrived first to remain 
behind, and the ·remaining people to go to another room. The four confederates 
·and one naive .§. thus remained, while the other eight .§.s were directed to 
separate rooms and requested to wait their turns. 
The four confederates and the naive S were seated in a semi-circle 
facing the experimenter, with the naive.§. on the experimenter's extreme 
right. They were then told: 
"I have here a list of statements about Africans, taken from group 
discussions held among students a while ago. They are all real statements:· 
they haven't been thought up by me. They have been. cast in the form of a 
questionnaire with four forcing response categories. What I want you to do 
is·respond to each of these statements with one of the following: strongly 
disagree or disagree; agree or strongly agree. You will notice that there is 
no neutral category. To some statements you may want to give a neutral 
response. Or you may want to qualify your response, or say "it depends". 
In any case, you must choose whichever of the four responses ~ fits your 
true attitude, however inadequately. Any questions?" o 
'~ . 
The experimenter then proceeded to read out the first statement. Each 
group member responded to the statement in turn, the naiye .§. responding last. 
The experimenter made a note of all the responses. The procedure was repeated 
for each of the 24 items in the attitude scale. In group P(O) the confeder-
ates were instructed to give as strongly pro-African responses as they felt 
they could plausibly give, and vice-versa for the A(O) group. It will be 
remembered that the statements are specifically s~lected to span the complete 
Thurstone continuum. This means that some statements are rather extreme. 
It was felt that if the confederates gave the most extreme responses possible 
even to the extreme statements, the ~s might suspect deception. (This 
assumption later turned out to be unwarranted). 
After the whole scale had. been gone through once, the first confederate 
was asked to leav~ the group and call in the next~· The remaining Sa were 
requested to move round' one place to the left to make rciom for the new ~· 
The whole procedure was then repeated, with the three remaining confederates 
responding first to each statement. The results for this second generation 
were noted separately. 
The procedure was repeated for 9 generations, with the "youngest" 
member of the microculture giving his response last in each case. By the 
fifth generation, all the confederates had left the group. By the ninth 
generation, there was no ~ present in the group who was ever in the group 
contemporaneously with any of the confederates. 
·The experimental paradigm of groups (0) and A(O) may be diagrammatic-




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1st confed: X 
2nd II X x. 
3rd 11 X X X 
4th II X X X X 
1st§.: 0 0 0 0 0 
2nd§.: 0 0 0 0 0 
3rd .§.: 0 0 0 0 0 
4th.§.: 0 0 0 0 0 
5th§.: 0 0 0 0 0 
6th§.: 0 0 0 0 
7th§.: 0 0 0 
. 8th.§.: 0 0 
9th S: 0 
. -
This procedure was found to be tedious and repetitive. Furthermore 
the rule followed by the confederates in giving the most extreme responses to 
the statements that they felt they could plausibly give, led to sufficiently 
diverse and nonunanimous responses among the confederates for the experimenter 
to feel that the tension in the group was noticeably released. 
While the results from these groups were retained'for analysis,· 
the following modifications were introduced and adhered to in groups P(l), 
P(2), P(3) and A(l), A(2) and A(3): 
.. 
. (a) The groups were reduced in size to four (initially three 
confederates and one naive.§). The literature (Asch, 1951, 
Goldberg, 1954, Kidd, 1958 and Campbell and Jacobs, 1961) 
suggests that this will not have resulted in any great reduction 
in the power of the normative pressure; 
(b) For each generation, only one form of the scale was used, starting 
(c) 
with form A til the first generation in each case. This meant that 
each of the £s who was present in the group for the maximum of 
. 'four generations, responded to the whole scale (forms A and B) 
twice. 
Various personalit,y measures were taken for each S. While waiting 
. -
his turn before entering the group, ~d after passing through the 
56 • 
group, each£ responded to the Self-Ideal discrepancy, Independence 
(d) 
. (e)- . 
of Judgment and Forced-choice F scales. 
Finally, each£ was ~ubmitted to a post-experimental interview. 
I . 
The interviews were de,liberately· unstructured in order to maximise 
the probabili t,y of obtaining unexpected information of a quali tativ~ 
nature. However, amo~g the questions asked in all the post-
experimental interviews are those given in appendix D. . 
The confederates gave .the most extreme responses possible to each . ,, . ' 
item. The experimental paradigm for groups P(l), P(2), P(3), and 
. ,! ( 




1 2 3 4 5 6 
Form: A B A B A B 
1st confed: X 
. 2nd II X X 
3rd II : X X X 
1st S: 0 0· 0 0 
2nd.§.: 0 0 0 0 
3rd .§.: 0 0 0 0 
4th..§.: 0 0 0 
'· 
5th.§.: 0 0 
6th.§.: 0 
7th.§.: 
By the fourth generation, the group consisted entirely of 
naive .§.s in each case, and by the seventh generation there were no 










The dependent variable (from which attitude change has to be 
inferred) is attitude toward Africans as measured by the scale described in 
chapter 3. In the control condition, one full attitude scale score is 
available for each2, since each2 responded once to the equivalent forms 
A and B of the scale. However, in the experimental conditions the position 
is slightly complicated·. 
In experimental groups P(O) and A(O), each 2 responded to the 
whole scale (forms A and B) once for each generation that he was present in 
the group. Thus for each of these 2s there are 5 scores, except the last 
four 2s who were present in the group for 4, 3, 2, and 1 generations 
.. respectively. Similarly (but not identically) in groups P(l), P(2), P(3) 
and A(l), A(2) and A(3), each S responded four times to alternating forms 
A and B of the scale (one form for each generation) except the last three 
§s, who responded thrice, twice and once respectively, the last~ responding 
to form A only. 
It was therefore arbitrarily decided to use for initial gross . 
analysis the first full attitude scale score obtainable from the responses 
·of each S. This rule was followed in obtaining an attitude score for each - ' 
S except the last Sa in experimental groups P(l), P(2), P(3) and A(l), A(2) - . -
and A(3), since each of these Ss was present in the group for one generation 
·only arid thus responded to only one form of the scale. Each of these .§.s' 
half-score was doubled in order to make the scores commensurate with those 
of the. other ~a. The high equivalent-form reliability of the scale (at 
least •88) suggests that this procedure will not have introduced very much 
error .• 
.,. 
The scores obtained in this way for the total sample of Ss 




Control (a = 166) 
9.80 
A(n = 30) 
10.56 
P{n = 30) 
14.27 
59· 
The control condition generated the lowest mean score, followed 
by experimental condition A, with experimental condition P showing the most 
· favoUrable mean attitude toward Africans. To test the significance of the 
differences between these three means, Me Guigan (1968) recommends Duncan's 
Range Test. Applied to this data, it yields.§! = 6.133. As indicated, 
the difference between the means of the control and P conditions is significant · 
{,!l2 = 3.26, .E.< .01); the difference between the means of conditions A and 
P is likewise significant (ll2 = 3.143, . .E. < .05); and the difference 
between the means of the control and A conditions is nonsignificant 
(.!l2 = 2.41). 
It appears that, considering ~s from all generations of the 
experimental groups together, the experimental treatment P succeeded in 
. introducing~s to express a significantly more favourable mean attitude 
toward Africans than would be expected had they responded on an individual 
basis. However the experimental treatment A did not apparently have a 
nett effect of lowering the mean score significantly. 
5.1 Analysis by generations 
A more detailed representation of the results is given by 
plotting the score for each naive § in each generation. A detailed 
representation of the scores of the eighteen§s in experimental groups 
60. 
P(O) and A(O) is given in figure 3. The successive scale scores for 
each~ is represented by an unbroken line spanning the number of generations 
the ~ was present in the group. 
Figure 4 represents the averaged results of groups P(O) and 
A(O). For each generation, the mean attitude scale score obtained by 
the naive §s in the two groups is plotted. In addition, for purposes of 
comparison, a baseline representing the mean attitude score obtained by 
the control group§s is plotted repetitively for each generation. 
Figures 5, 6," 7, 8, 9 and 10 represent the results for the 
other experimental groups in a similar fashion. Figure 11 represents the 
averaged results of the six four-person groups combined, and Figure 12 the 
averaged results of all the groups. 
The differences between the mean attitude scores for the two 
conditions show a gradual decline over generations. In order to test the 
significance of these differences at each generation, ~-tests (one-tailed) 
were computed using the grouped results represented in Figure 12. The 
value of 1 shows a corresponding gradual decline : 
61. 
GENERATION 
1 2 4 5 6 
.1 = .974 6.37 1.82 ' 1.51 .658 .536 
.2 .01 .05 .1 
Using the means for each group instead of individual scores, we 
. get (with,!l = 8): 
GENERATION . \\ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
.! • .974 2.99 .739 2.67 .426 .945 
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The surprisingly low values of l for generation 1 are probab~ 
due to the fact that only one naive~ was present in each group at the 
first generation, and therefore n is small. 
72. 
A crucial question which has to be answered is whether the radically 
different norms established by the confederates in the two experimental 
conditions survived the total replacement of these confederates by naive Ss. 
In other words, are the.differences between the means in Figures 4, 6, 8 and 
10 significant even after the direct influence of the confederates has been 
removed and the groups are made up entirely of naive .§a? This can not be 
. answered f~om the results in Fi~~ 12, since the generation at which the 
l I· 
removal of the last confederate took place depended upon the size of the 
group (Figure 12 contains data from 5-person groups and 4-person iroups). · 
I 
For this reason a further· l - test was computed using the mean 
scores for the .§s present in each group, the first generation after the 
removal of the last confederate. Comparing the means for the two 
i t 1 985 \.05 (one-tailed) •. cond tiona, _ = • , · .R < Therefore the 
differences between the means of the two conditions survived the total 
replacement_ of the norm-generating cop.federates by naive Sa. 
5.2 Change over generations 
It ;.a apparent from Figure 12 that the prO..: and ·anti-African norms .. 
introduced into the experimental groups resulted in attitude .change in the 
.§a. However it is equally clear that th~ power of these norms declined 
over generations. 
There are two ways in which this might have occurred. · The attitude 
of each s may have tended to revert back to a less extreme'level over 
. - . . 
.generations, or each newS entering the group may have displayed less attitude . 
change than his predecessor, tending to be less extreme from the start of 
his existence in the group. 
Both effects may have operated simultaneously. The analysis of 
the value-information content of attitudes in conjunction with cognitive 
dissonance theory, however, would predict little (if any) change in attitude 
·on the part of individual .§.a over successive generations. 
'( 
In order to investigate the significance of within-S change over 
trials (generations), a number of Sign Tests for matched pairs of scores 
were compu,ted. The last.§. in ,each group had, of course, to be omitted 
from these calculations. 
For the significance of the proportion of Ss changing between. 
the~r first and last trials away from the norm set by the confederates, . 
.! • 1.25, ~ < 1.0, which is not significant (one-tailed). 
On the other hand, a significant proportion of .§.a became more 
favourable toward Africans from,their first to their last trials, 
irrespective of which condition .~ey had been assigned to (! • 2.18, 
~< .03, two-tailed). This unexpected effect is not significant 
1 n · 
I 
between first and second or first and third trials for each s. 
It is interesting to note: in passing here that of 52 .§.a present 
in the groups for at least two generations, only 11 achieved the same · 
. . .. J . . 
attitude score on the first and last trials. An examination of Figures 
- 3, 50 7 and 9 will give some idea of the radical fluctuations which took 
h 
place in some of the ~s over generations. 
•n 
~~ .. -. .. 
The decline in the power of the norms induced by the experimental . 
manipulations does not appear to be explicable in terms of intra-individual. 
. . 
attitude change over generationslJ The other possibility is that each new 
2 in the group tended to be less extreme than his immediate predecessor. 
For the proportion of Ss achieving a more moderate average _attitude_ 
score than their immediate predecessors, - .3.85, .I! < .025, one-
tailed). The phenomenon of declining norms over generations is thus 
accounted for. The converging graphs in Figure 12 can now·- be ·seen in 
terms of the decreasing effectiveness of the norms in inducing attitude 
: I 
change in new Ss entering-the groups • 
. 5.3 We!ghting ratios 
Not .. one single .§. (in the experimental conditions, out of 
n a 60) achieved an attitude score as extreme as that of the confederates. 
Confederates in grqups P(l), P(2), and P(3) gave responses which would result 
· in the maximum score of 24 on the scale, while confederates in condi tiona 
A(l), A(2) ,and A(3),gave. respons~s equivalent to a score of Oe In the, 
control condition-~ = 166) fo~.§.s achieved a score of 24 and two Ss 
scored o. 
It is desirable to know how influential the norm was in determining . 
1 
the attitudes of the experimental .§.sp in comparison with all other factors 
which determine their attitudes taken togetherw 
Unfortunately it is not possible to make the necessary calculations 
for all the experimental 2s• While the_ norm confronting the first naive 
S_during the first generation was unanimous, and therefore unitary and 
~ . . 
quantifiable~ the situation from the second generation on was variable and 
.. 
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ephemeral. Furthermore, in groups P(O) and A(O) even the confederates· 
were not always unanimous, nor did they invariably give the most extreme 
possible responses. For these reasons the following calculations were 
confined to the first naiive ~sin groups P(l), P(2), P(3) and A(l), 
A(2) and A(3) • 
The weighting for the P condition is given by the formula. 
(MEAN A~ITUDE IN P CONDITION) - (MEAN ATTITUDE IN CONTROL CONDITION) 
(NORM) . - {MEAN ATI'ITUDE IN P CONDITION) 
/1 ' 
Substituting in this formula, a weighting ratio of 1.13 is 
obtained. An analagous computation for condition A yields a weighting 
ratio of 1.10. 
These figures indicate that the norms in the two experimental 
conditions were approximately as powerful in influencing the responses 
\ 
of the first naive ~s as all other determining factors considered together. 
i 
In fact, in both cases the Ss attached ..!!2£! weight to the attitudes expressed 
', tl 
by the confederates than to all f~ctors determining the attitudes of ~s in 
an individual setting. These find;Lngs demonstrate a startling susceptibility 
., I 
of high-~ attitudes to modification through normative pressure.·, 
5o4 Personality factors 
It has been shown that the attitudes expressed by th~ confederates 
in the experimental condi tiona determined to a considerable extent the 
attitudes of the ~a. The influence of the confederates upon the responses of 
the ~Iii. was direct and powerful in the first generations; and indirect and less 
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powerful in later generations. It is now desirable to determine what other 
factors determined the Ss attitudes. 
An inspection of Figures 3, 5, 7 and 9 reveals that a great deal 
of variance remains to be accounted for. What factors, apart from the 
manipulations might reasonably be expected to account for the remaining 
variance? 
For one thing, it can be surmised that normative pressure from 
reference groups outside the experimental situation was present in the 
Ss minds inside the experimental situation. It is beyond the scope of 
this study to investigate these extra-experimental social factors directly~ 
Another set of potential ·sources of variance includes more-o~less 
stable individual differences, or personality traits. Thre~ of the person-
ality variables most likely to account for variance in the dependent 
variable were measured. They were measured by means of the Self-Ideal 
discrepancy Scale (S-1 D), the forced-choice F scale (F) and the 
Independence of Judgment Scale (lJ), Three of the Ss in groups P(l), P(2), 
P93) and A(l)~ A(2) and A(3) had·to be.omitted from calculations involving 
these measures because, for one reason and another, they failed to complete 
all the forms. 
5.41 Correlational data 
For ! = 39, a Pearson product-moment intercorre~ation matrix 
was computed, in order to detertnine' any relat~onships am~ng the personality 
variables themselves 1 




S- 1 D ' - •041 - ~095 I t 
' F t - ·5t;17 + ' I 
' IJ • t 
The on1y.high correlation is the correlation between F and IJ, 
and this negative correlation is significant (e <: .01). 
In order to ascertain the degree of linear relationship between 
each of these three personality variables and the measure of avourableness 
toward Africans. computations could be based upon all avariable scores. 
However personalit.y factors may be associated with attitudes indirectly : 
they may have affected the degree to which the ~s evinced attitude change 
as a result of normative pressure. Since the amount of normative pressure 
was relatively slight for later generations in. each group, it was decided 
to confine the computations to the scores of the .§.s in the first two 
generations in each group. In this way the power of the norma was held 
more-or-less constant. It is then possible to calculate not only the 
degree of linear relationship between.each personalit,y variable and 
favourableness toward Africans, but also the degree of linear relationship 
·between each persona~i ty variable and amount of conformi t.Y to the group 
norma. 
Before proceeding with these calculations, it was desirable for 
purposes of generalisation to know 'whether this relatively small group of . . 
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.§.s was fairly repreeentati~e of all ~s a_s far as the distribu_ti?n of perso~­
ality scores was concerned. A comparison of the means and standard deviations 
·of the three personalit.Y measuresp for the whole experimental group of ~s 
and for the selected sub~roup, is reassuring : 
ALL ~s (! = :59) 
I Mean Standard Deviation ' I 
' ' t 
s- 1 D • 7.7226 2.3640 ' ' ' F ' 47.7436 11.1844 ' I I 
I J ' 5.3846 1.6954 ' 
FIRST TWO Sa IN EACH GROUP (!! =- 12) 




s- 1 D I 7.3350 li.9465 I 
I 
I 
F I 51.3333 12.3387 ' I • I J ' 5.1667 1.8505 I 
A measure of conformit.y for ~s in the P condition is given by 
their scale scores indicating degree of favourableness toward Africans 
. (since the norm = the maximum score for the scale, approx.). For the 
~s in the A condition, conformity is given by the maximum scale score 
minus the scores for each~ (since the norm = the minimum scale score, 
approx.). The results of computations of.correlation coefficients 
between each of the personality variables and the attitude and conformity 
scores respectively is given below s 
CONFORMITY ATTITUDE 
S- 1 D ·053 •001 
F 
•543 + . 
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With such a small ,!!,' it is important not to overinterpret rs 
. -
which look high l;lut do not reach significance. The only significant.!: 
here is between independence of judgment and favourableness toward Africans. 
This correlation is positive (o543) and~< •05. The amount of variance 
in the attitude scores accounted for by independence of judgment is given 
. ~ 2 by Y.. • .!: • • 296 • We can conclude that, in the case of the first 
two .§.s in each group (who were confronted with the most powerful norms) ' 
approximately 30 per cent of the variance_ is accounted for by this factor. 
(The expected negative correlation between independence of judgment and-
conformity was not found). 
A further inference from the correlational data is permissible. 
;I \ 
Since authoritarianism and independence of judgment are (significantly) 
~ I 
negatively c9rrelated, it follows that the negative correlation found 
between authoritarianism ~d favourableness-toward Africans ( - •357) is 
I ' 
probably not due to chance, although it does not reach significance because 
' I. 
of the small .!!• It can tentatiVely be inferred that approximately 13 per 
cent of the variance in attitudes toward Africans is due to authoritarianism • 
. ·I 
5.42 Analyses of Variance 
It has been hypothesised that some of the personality variables 
will interact with the experiment.~! treatment to determine the .§.s scores on 
the attitude measure. In order t:o test for these possible interactions, and 
to supplement the purely linear interpretations of relationships derivable 
from the correlational analysis, three 3 x 2 factorial designs were 
abstracted from the data and analysed by mixed-model analyses of variance. 
'I 
so. 
The .§.s were ranked according to their scores on each of the three . 
personali~ measUr~s Reparately, and in each case the rank was divided at 
the tertiles, giving a low (L), medium (M) and a high (H) group. The 
factorial designs then each comprised three random levels of the personali~ 
variable X two treatments. 
This procedure inevitably involved a small amount of subject loss. 
Whenever it was necessary to discard .§.s, the rule was followed of always 
discarding those who entered the groups latest, since these .§.s were least 
affected by the manipulated independent variable (see 5.2 above). The 
. resulting designs, with~s used for analysis, are given diagrammatically 
below: 
SELF-ESTEEM X TREATMENT Q[ = 30) 
H S- 1 D M S- 1 D L S- 1 D 
: 
p n: 5 n: 5 n = 5 
A n..:. 5 n- 5 n- 5 
AUTHORITrARIANISM X TREATMENT Q[- 30) 
HF MF LF 
p n:5 
I 
n: 5· n: 5 
A n: 5 n:s 5 nc5 
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INDEPENDENCE OF JU:I)JMENT X TREATMENT (! - 24) 
HI J L I J 
' 
p n-4 n-4 n-4 
A n:4 n:4 n =!4 
_ The results of the analyses of variance may be summarised as 
follows : 
SELF-ESTEEM X TREATMENT 
I 
Source of variance I ss ~ M.S. ! .R< I 
I 
I 
Treatment I 95.3 1 95.30 1.65 n.s._ I 
I 
I 
S-lD I 81.9 2 40.95 .49 n.s. I 
I 
I 
Treatment x S - 1 D I 115.8 2 57.90 .69 n.s. I 
I 
I 
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AUTHORITARIANISM X TREATMENT 
'' Source of variance I ss I -~ 11:.§.:. 
I 
I 
Treatment I 253.33 I 1 253.33 
I 
I 
F ' 661.00 I 2 330.50 
I 
' Treatment x F t 84.90 I 2 42.45 
I 
I 








INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGMENT X TREATMENT 
I 
Source of variance ' ss i4.:_' 11& I I 
I 
Treatment I 140.00 1 140.0 , I 
' I .,
IJ 'I 500.10 2 250.1 I 
I 
I 
Treatment x lJ I 7.60 2 3.8 I 
I 
' Within-cell I 528.80 18 29.4 ' I 










! Jl < 
36.9 .05 + 
8.6 .• 01 + 
~13 n.s. 
HIJ" MIJ" l.I\T 
p 
.The conclusions that can be· drawn from these analyses, are that 
the following factors account significantly for the variance in attitudes 
· toward Africans: 
(a) The treatment (P or A); 
(b) . Authoritarianism; and 
(c) Independence of Judgment. 
None of the interactions is significant, althoug~ authoritarianism 
x treatment approaches significance. We may tentatively speculate that~s 
obtaining an intermediate score on the authoritarianism measure are most 
susceptible to attitude change. It .has been pointed out in 1.1 above that 
the salience of an issue to an individual may influence the extent to which 
he is suscep:tible to attitude change on that issue through normative pressure. 
. . . ' 
An interaction between authoritarianism 8.rid treatment would be easily inter-
pretable along these lines; such an interaction makes sense. 
.. -· .. 
5.5 Qualitative data: post-experimental interview 
It is of the utmost importance to the interpretation of these 
findings, to know whether a significant number of ~s saw through the 
deception. It was chiefly for this reason, but also to determine the 
personal reactions of the ~s that the post-experimental interview was 
conducted. 
An examinatioll' of the answers of the ~s to the question :"What 
do you think the purpos~ of the experiment was?" reveals th&t /not one 
single ~ guessed the true intentions of the experimenter. Most of the 
~s thought the purpose of the experiment was to survey "attitudes", . 
"opinions of students", or."prejudice". OneS even suggested that the 
purpose was "to find out.about Africans"1 
Even after the Sa were given a clue to the real purpose ("Did 
you feel under pressure?") only five 2s admitted feeling any pressure. 
Two of these five were first-generation entrants into the groups who were 
faced with the mo~t extreme pressure. All five of the ~s who admitted 
feeling p~essure qualified it with "slightly" or "a little" • .After being 
~ebriefed, two ~s said they saw what was going on {"Do you have any further 
comments which might interest us?"). 
Far from consciously feeling that they were being influenced by 
the others in the group, many ~s were "surprised" or "disgusted" at. the 
.. 
. others {"What were your reactions to the others in the group?") Q ~e 
reasons typically given are mutually contradictory : either the others "had 
fixed ideas" or "they contradicted themselves". One~ gave the more probable 
reason : "I got annoyed with one obvious Nat.". One S who had claimed to 
have :felt no pressure thought that the others in the group "were looking at 
.... 
me in an unfriendly way. I was asked to give opinions to which I am 
entitled". Several ~s spontaneously volunteered the ironical opinion 
that the group was fairly representative of campus opinion. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
The main conclusions that can be drawn from the results given in 
' Chapter 5 are gi van below : 
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(a) Experimental manipulation P was successful in influencing the 
attitudes of the ~s in a direction more favourable toward Africans; 
but manipulation A seemed only partially successful in influencing 
§s in an unfavourable direction. Hypothesis 1 is thus partially 
confirmed. 
(b) The amount of attitude change shown by the ~s gradually declined 
over generations, but remained significant beyond the total re-
placement of the norm-generating confederates by naive .§s, who . 
. themselves became the unwitting indoctrinators of "younger" group 
members. Hypothesis 2 is confirmed. 
(c) The decline in amount of attitude change over generations was not 
due to ~s reverting to their previous attitudes, but was due to 
each new§ being confronted by a weaker norm upon entering the 
group, and thus tending to show less attitude change than his 
predecessor. 
(d) The attitudes of the Ss exposed to the most powerful norm (the 
first na'i:ve .§.a in groups P(l), P(2), P(3), and A(l), A(2).and 
A(3) were influenced more by the norm generated by the confederates 
!han by all other factors added together. 
(e) The personalit.y characteristic : independence of judgment was one 
such other factor, accounting for approximately 30 per cent of the 
variance in the scores irrespe~tive of manipulation. Independent· 




(f) Authoritarianism also accounts for a small part of the variance in 
attitude scores (approximately 13 per cent), the authoritarian ~s 
expressing attitudes -significantly less favourable toward Africans. 
HYpothesis 5 is confirmed. 
(g) The interaction and authoritarianism x treatment approaches 
significance. Moderately authoritarian~s seemed to be more highly 
influenced by. the normative pressure than either high or low 
authoritarianism is highly predictive of attitude irrespective of ' 
treatment. 
(h) Self-esteem is not predictive of attitude or attitude change in 
any way. Hypothesis 4 is not confirmed. 
(i) The experimental manipulations were highly plausible, none of the 
~s apparently seeing through the deception and few ~eing aware of 
the normative pressure that changed their attitudes. 
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7. DISCUSSION 
It is possible to view social attitudes as "acquired -behavioural _ 
dispos~tions" or "syndromes of response consistency" operationally 
indistinguishable_ from habits in general. In one form or another, this is 
currently a· fairly widespread conception of" social attitudes. Campbell (1963) 
has spelt out most clearly the basic assumptions implied by such an approach. 
The model can not be right or wrong; it can rather be said to be 
more or less useful. Certainly, for the psychologist interested in invest-
igating attitude change, it seems to have proved less useful (see Chapter 1). 
One of the implications of the model is that a~titudes can be changed only by 
the slow processes of conditioning, counterconditioning and extinction. In 
--fact, any changes which cannot_be accounted for by such processes must be 
assigned to the ubiquitous dust-heap of "error variance". Attitudes must be 
viewed as "syndromes of response consistency" which remain invariant through 
all transitor,y changes in the individual's social and nonsocial environment. 
The present study is, in part, an indication of the amou:nt of 
information which is liable to be lost through such a restricted conception. 
. . . . 
The fact that many of an individual's attitudes can be seen as proceeding 
from groups, real or imagined, to which he belongs, refers himself, or aspires 
has, of course been recognised by psych~logists for a ver,y long time. On the 
other hand, there are probably "syndromes of response consistency" toward 
social objects which can be isolated in individuals, although this is not a 
- statement susceptible to empirical disproof. However that may be, it has been 
argued in the present dissertation that attitudes of high value-information 
content are unlikely to fall into this category, and the surprisingly wide 
variability in response to transitor.Y environmental changes is quite dramatic-
al~ demonstrated for one class of high-Hv attitudes. 
Three interrelated outcomes of the present investigation which 
were entirely unexpected, can retrospectively be interpreted as a further 
vindication of the theoretical framework in which it was cast. Firstly, 
the normative pressure under which the subjects in the P condition were 
placed, was more effective in changing their attitudes in a direction more 
favourable toward Africans, than was the A treatment effective in achieving 
the opposite result. Secondly, the norm in the A condition "evaporated" · 
noticeably more quickly over generations than did the norm in the P 
condition. Finally, .a significant proportion of subjects became more 
favourable toward Africans over trials. In addition it might be mentioned 
that the point of resolution in the final generations of the experimental 
groups after the effects had entirely vanished, was found to be higher in 
both treatment conditions (though not significantly so) than the mean score 
of the control group. 
The most parsimonious interpretation that can be placed on this 
set of interrelated outcomes, is that the method of posttesting the 
experimental subjects somehow induced a measure of attitude change. · It 
seems that there was a tendency for subjects in the experimental groups 
(regardless of treatment) to express attitudes more favourable toward 
Africans than the control subjects, especially as the tension in the group 
decreased •. 
This effect is easy to account for in retrospect. All the subjects 
knew that the research project was somehow connected with the Psychology 
Department of the University of Cape Town. The department has a reputation 
among .students of being relatively radically oriented. A few weeks prior to 
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the experimental testing, in fact, the local daily newspapers both carried 
front-page stories about the Psychology Department's unanimous support for 
a student sit-in protesting against conduct of the University Council over 
the appointment of an African lecturer. 
With more insight, the experimenter might have predicted, even 
before conducting the experiment, that a second {pro-African) normative 
pressure would inevitably be placed on all experimental subjects, 
irrespective of treatment condition. Such a prediction would have led to 
hypotheses analagous to the unexpected findings. The precise rationale 
for the hypotheses would have been that the subjects would be likely to 
fear negative evaluation by the experimenter for holding anti-African 
opinions. 
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The interpretation which has been given to the unpredicted findings 
focuses attention on an uncontrolled source of variance in the results of the 
experimente It was entirely to be expected that with the use of attitudes 
containing so much value-information, normative pressure from reference 
groups brought into the experimental room inside the subjects' heads was 
.. likely to influence their responses. Such effects are not only uncontrolled, 
but also uncontrollable in principle. ·And yet a very large proportion of the 
variance in the dependent variable was accounted for by the normative pressure 
in the actual experimental treatments~ The responses of· the first subjects in. 
each group were in fact determined more by the manipulated normative pressure 
t~ by all other factors added together (reference groups and personality 
variables included). The implication is tl:ia.t _the subjects were deeply -
influenced by the norm of an entirely ad hoc group of strangers, which had· 
no particular instrumental significance for them. The findings contain a 
dynamic portrait of Prote.an Man in action. 
111 . if 
The results would have possessed less potential explanatory power, 
had the subjects been submitted to some grossly out-of-the-way or abnormal 
procedures in order to induce attitude change. However, on the contrary, 
the post-experimental interview protocols show clearly that the subjects 
regarded the whole procedure as entirely run-of-the-mill, even dull. There 
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is no indication that the experimental subjects reacted essentially differently 
from the way they customarily react in any social situation involving a 
discussion of Africans, despite all the data collected specifically, to 
detect such differences. 
Experiments on attitude change, in which the subjects are entirely· 
unaware of any real or expected change, are disappointingly rare in the 
literature. Most experiments involve bombarding the subjects with "propaganda" 
communications. Such procedures may be entirely inappropriate in the modifica-
tion of ~ttitudes containing a great deal of value-information, and they are 
certainly contrived. In the "real-life" situation, fundamental changes in 
this class of attitudes seldom (if ever) follows from the reception of a 
specifiable persuasive communication. It occurs simultaneously with the 
establishment of new social contacts or exposure to new reference groups, 
or so the analysis of value-information in Chapter 1 suggests. In addition, 
information about the norms of these groups is almost invariably conveyed to 
the individuals indirectly. 
Some evidence has been cited in Chapter 1 that "overheard" 
communica tiona may be inherently more persuasive than direct communications • 
possibly because the individual's defenses ~re not aroused and attention is 
detracted from the (potentially embarrassing) change in attitude. In this 
connection it is interesting to consider Robert Rosenthal's (1967) most 
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~ecent and ongoing research. Rosenthal has shown that if schoolteachers 
are presented with a randomly selected list of pupils, and are told that the 
results of "psychological testing" suggest that these pupils are likely to 
"bloom" scholastically during the year, these pupils do in fact "bloom" 
significantly more than other pupils. The self-fulfilling prophecy is 
conveyed through some subtle communication; far more effective than -
influences school teachers are able voluntarily to muster, between teacher 
and pupils. Similar subtle communications, with equally dramatic effects, 
have frequently been demonstrated to occur without awareness between 
scientific experimenters and their assistants. Again similarly, young 
children probably acquire language without formal instruction far more 
quickly and efficiently than their more intelligent elders do with all the 
advantages of modern technological instruction. (Wiener, 1954). 
It is partly as a result of a preoccupation with "direct" 
communication that attitude-change research to date has failed to produce 
any well-validated analogue of the phenomenon of deep attitudinal conversion. 
The same preoccupation may account, in part, for a general failure to obtain 
unambiguous information concerning the personality correlates of persuasibility. . .. 
The present study has taken one halting step in the direction of greater realism 
in these regards. 
Some of the data concerning personality and attitude change in the 
present study are difficult to interpret. Authoritarianism and Independence 
of Judgment were both found to be predictive of attitude toward Africans. 
The finding that independent subjects had attitudes more favourable toward 
Africans than yielding subjects, is not altogether surprising when one considers 
. . . . . - . ~ . 
·the (macro)-cultural norms operating on the subjects. However the subjects of 
. ' 
independent judgment were apparently not independent in the experimental 
manipulations: they displayed as much attitude change as the yielding 
subjects. Furthermore, the well-established relationship between self-· 
esteem and susceptibility to social influence was not replicated. And 
finally, extreme authoritarianism and extreme non-authoritarianism seemed 
to be predictive of resistance to attitude change, ~thoUgh this tendency 
was not significant. 
The failure to find any clearcut personality correlates of attitude 
change, either by correlational analysis or by analysis of variance, was 
disappointing. There are two possible explanations for the failure : 
either a series of Type II errors was made; or the attitude change and 
conformity demonstrated in the experimental situations was quite unlike the 
attitude change and conformity described in the literature from which the 
hypotheses concerning possible personality correlates were derived. 
The first explanation is prima facie improbable. The second, on 
the other hand, is extremely plausible. A fundamental aim of the present study 
was to demonstrate certain properties of attitudes containing high value-
information, which are not to be expected in the types of attitudes upon which 
most of the experimental literature on attitude change is based. 
A major limitation of the present study is that it does not include 
duplicated procedures using attitudes of low value-information content. Only 
once this has been done will it be possible to make any conclusive statement 
I 
regarding the specificity of the findings over a restricted range of attitude 
variables. The study has created a need for further research along these lines • 
8. SUMMARY 
(a) Attention was drawn to the information about an individual 
conveyed by his expressed attitudes. A dimension of attitudes, 
consisting of the amount of latent value-information which they 
contain, was identified and defined. It was deduced that 
attitudes of high value-information content are potentially 
highly susceptible to change through changing normative pressure. 
(b) The literature on attitude change was selectively reviewed from 
the point of view of th~ extent to which different approaches to 
attitude change have considered attitudes of high value-
information contenta · It was shown that whereas most research 
on attitude change has been restricted to attitudes low on this 
dimension, the extent to which theoretical conceptions of 
attitude change take account of social factors, is related to 
the extent to which they imply applicability to attitudes of 
high value-information content. 
(c) An experimental design, involving attitude manipulation through 
Asch-type normative pressure,. was described, and methods of 
maximising value-information, including the use of attitudes 
toward Africans, were proposed. 
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(d) The development of a scale to measure attitudes toward Africans 
using the scale-discrimination technique was described. The 
properties of the scale, 'including unidimensionali ty, discriminating 
power and diversity of item content, were set out. The instruments 
chosen for the measurement of personality were discussed. 
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(e) The experimental treatments, involving the creation of laboratory 
microcultures, were described. Starting with a standard Asch 
situation, the confederates are removed one by one and replaced 
by additional naive ~s. The norm introduced by the confederates 
is thus expected to be transmitted for several generations, each 
new naive~ becoming an unwitting collaborator in the conspiracy. 
. . 
(f) The results of the experiment were presented, the most notable 
among them being : attitude change in the direction of a more 
favourable attitude toward Africans was more successfully 
achieved than the reverse; the amount of attitude. change 
displayed by the Sa declined over generations of the laboratory - " 
microcul tures, but rema.ined significant beyond the total replacement 
of the confederates w~th naive ~s; and Independence of Judgment and 
authoritarianism were predictive of attitude toward Africans but 
,1 I 
not of attitude change. 
(g) The results were disc~saed, some limitations of thestudy were 
mentioned, and suggest;ions for further research were offered. 
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insensitive 
7. severe 8 ......................... .. . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . lenient 
s. peaceful ..................... . .. . . . . ·I· ....... . . ..... . . ..... . agressive 
9. cautious · · · • · · · · • · · · · · • · • · · · · · · · · • .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . risky 
l 0. proud .. e • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .• .. • • • • • • • • • • t •••••••• humble 












sharp • · • • .• • • • • • • • j •••••••• . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ . 
i 
forward• • • • • • • · • • • • .,. • · • · • • · . . . . . . " ...... " .. . . . . . . . . ........ . 
full •••••••••.• , •••••• ~ •• 
optimistic · • · · · · · · · • · · · • • · · · · • · • · · · • · · · • · 
••••• Cl •••••••••• 
................. 
obedient • • • ..................................... -.............. . 
tall 0 ••••••••••• . .. •·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 
sociable . . . . . . . . . . . I 'i • 
i 
organized .....•• i . 
I 
·tolerant • • • • • • • • ~ . •. l • • • • I ..... . 
. ... ................ ~ ....... . 
. ..... , .... . ...................... . 
. . . . .. . . . . . . ....... I ............... . 
fearless • • • • • • • • • · · •j · • • • • • • • 
vain " · · · · • · • • • · · i· • • • • • • • 
. ........... -........ t' . ... ~ I • ~ ....... •t ••. 


















. . . 
OPINION QTJESTIONAIRE APPE-NDIX B .. 
The following statements refer to opinions regarding a nunibe:t of issues. You are 
asked to state your own opiilion. Please respond by. circling tlie code closest to 
your own feelings. 
@ 
e.g. 
Chewing bubble . gum 
i~ a bad habit. $AMAAAMASA 
,.,: Chewing bubble gum .. 










I .. / 
'- ' 
1., , One of the most important _ . '•., Obedience and re;5pect for 
things children should . . . .',. SA , MA A A MA .3A. authority are the most 
learn is when to disobey . ) important virtues childre11 
authorities. si10uld learn • . ~ . ; 
2 • Books and the cinema 
. '· 
ought not to cleal so much 
. with the u~1pleasant and 
seamy side of life; 
they ou.ght to concentrate 
. on themes that are enter-
t:ainil1J or- upliftin~. 
3. Insults to our honour are 
. not always important enough 
to bother about •. 
i < 
l .• . ' 
SA IV'J.A A A MA SA 
Boo!~s and the cinema 
ought to give a more 
reali~tic picture of life 
even if they shO\¥ that evil 
sometimes triumphs over 
3"000. i,' 
An insult to our honm~r 
SA MA A A MA SA should always be puri.l.shed. 
I .· 
. 4. No·wdays more and more ~·' ... '!""~ • ' • The1·e are times when it 
is necessa:ry to probe into 
even the most personal 
a~·~d plivate matters 
people are prying into matters .,A 
that should remain personal ;::, 
and private. 
WJ.A A A MA SA 
. . 5. It is alright for people to 
raise questions about even 
the most sacred matters. 
~ . v. Young people sometimes get 
rebellious ideas, but as they 
_ 1 . grQw up th~y ought to get 
over them and settle down. 
7. People ougr~.t to pay more 
attention to new ideas even 
if they seem to go against 
the South African way of 
life. 
3. What youtL needs most is 
strict discipline, rug~ed 
determination and the 
will to work and fight 
for family and country. 
SA NiA A A MA SA 
. Eve1-y person shquld have 
complete faith in some surer-
natural powe:r, who~e decis-
ions 'he obeys without ques-
.)'. ). tion •. 
If it \'/ere not for the 
rebelliou. s ideas of. youth 
SA rviA A A MA SA · 
<!' .there would be less 
SA 1\f.IA A A lVlA SA 
SA IVlA A A MA SA 
progress in the world. 
The true South African 
way of life is disappea1·ing 
so fast that force may be 
necessary to preserve 
it. 
In the lon:.; 1·un it is bette1· 
for our coillltry if y6unJ 
people are allowed a 
great deal of personal 
freedom and are not 
strictly disciplined. 
9. An urge to jump from hJh 
places· 's r-•robably tte 
.... - ~-
result of unhappy personal SA J.V1A A A lv'.fA SA 
exreriences rather than 
· · somethi.n~ inborn. 
10. It ~s essential for learn·mg 
or effective wor:, tt.at our 
· tead!.ers or superv·~sors SA IV.IA. A A MA SA 
outline i.n detail what is to . · 
be 9one a<id exactly ho.v to 
do it. 
'. . ,. / 
11. It is highly lli11Hcety that 
· astrology wm ever be SA W.IA A A MA SA 
able to explain anything~ 
12. No vveakness or diffi.culty 
can hold us back if we h~ve SA 1iJ.A A A MA SA 
enOaJt: ¥Vill power. 
13. 
14. 
•• • 1, 
Tr;e Lnclinzs of scie:1ce may 
someday show that many of 
our most d·erished beliefs 
are v,rronJ. 
No sane, normal, decent 
person would ever tt;.~1k 
of hurtinra close frie:.1d 
or relative. 
15. In spite of what you read 
about tte w Ud sex Hfe of 
people in important 
places tbe real story is 
about the same in a,ny 
··.group· of peorle. 
SA W.iA A A MA SA 
SA MA A A MA SA 
SA MA A A MA SA 
Some i>eorle are born 
#ith an ur:Je to: jump from 
b\gh places. 
You ..vill do i:Jetter wvc: 
in the lon~ rut1 if you do 
tb.b3's your ow·n way 
ratl:..er than by follo•vinJ 
tr ed a;.·.ct tree r;:rocedL:res. 
Some day it w:n probably 
· be si-own tl:at astroloJY 
caL·. explain a lot of thin~s. 
TLere ai.·e many difficulties 
a re:;:sun car..not overcome · 
no matter Lo·;v mucL w·.ll-
Scie.1ce Las its 1:.lace, but 
there are ma•1Y importa;1t 
thin1s that can neve1· r-os-
sibly be unc~erstood by tbe 
human mi.nd. · 
It is only natural for peor-le 
to sometimes Lave tl.louj!~ts 
·about hu:rtLnJ a close fr end 
or rela~~ve . 
The vvi.ld sex life of the 
old Greeks and i~omalJ.s was 
tame compared to some oi 
the 3'0in~s on in tlJs country 
. even {n places where peo[.le 
n1l1la least expect it. 











ATTITUDE SCAlE __ ... _.... _____ ..., _____ _ 
What the youth needs most is strict discipline, rugged determination, 
and the will to work and fight for family and country. 
Some of my friends think th.at my ideas are impractical if not a bit' 
wild. 
··.,, 
.· · Kindness ·and ·generosity are the most important qualities for a wife 
to have~ 
· 1 have seen some things so sad that I almost felt like crying~ 
~· .{ 
I don't under stand how men in some ~uropean· countries can be so'·· 
,· ,,~ · ..· 
· demonstrative to one another. · · · 
· I'must admit that I would fL.'1d it hard to have fo} a· close frined a 
person whose manners or appearance make him somewhat repulsive, 
not matter how kind or brilliant he might be. 
A person should not probe too deep~y into his own and other people's 
feelings, but take things as they are. 
I prefer team games to games in which one individual competes 
against another. '; 
I could cut my moorings - quit my home, my family, and my friends 
- without suffering great regrets. 
What this country needs most, moie·than laws and political programme~, 
is a few courageous, tireless, devoted leaders in whom the people can 
... ,.. ., 
True 
• • • • 
• • • • 
•••• 
• • • • 
•• 9. 
G t t. 
" • e • 
. ...... .; 
..... 
put their faith. .. ••• 
. ,. 
ll. I acquired a strong interest in intellectual and esthetic matters from 
my mother. ; 
12. Human nature being what it is, there will always be war_ and conflict. 
13. I believe you should ignore other people's faults and make an effort to 
get along with almost everyone. 
14. ·The best theory is the one that has the best practical applications. 
15. I lilce., to fool around with new ideas. even if they turn out later to be a 
total waste of time .. 
16. The unfini,sl).ed and the imperfect often have greater appeal for me 
than the c<,>mpleted and polished. 
, I 
17. I would rather have a few intense friends:t\ips than a great many 
friendly but casual relationships.· 
2/ •••.•• " 
• • Ill • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 





















1. Did you enjoy taking part in this 
experiment? 
2. What do you think the purpose of the 
experiment was? 
3. What were your reactions? 
4. Did you feel under pressure? 





D E B R I E F I N G 
) 
6. Do you have any further comments which 
might interest ~s? Any questions? 
APPENDIX E. 
TABULATED RAW SCORES. 
:itudes. 
·>) ' generation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
12 15 13 13 12 16 15 12 18 
18 16 16 12 15 12 17 20 
15 14 13 12 16 18 24 
11:.' 12 15 18 24 19 
13 19 23 18 20 
·X. 12.00 ·16.50 14.66 13.50 12.40 15.40 16.80 17.80 20.20 
' 
.) ' generation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10 11 9 9 2 11 5 
7 6 3 '9 5 12 
9 11 6 8 7 
4 10 5 8 
X. 10.eo 9.00 8.00 6.75 7.00 7.25 8.00 
!) ' generation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
... 
12 12 12 12 3 3 0 
5 4 4 1 2 1 
3 3 1 . 7 1 
3 4 3 3 
X 12.00 8.50 6.33 5.50 2."25 3.75 1.25 
APPeNDIX e:. 
TABULATED RAW SCORES.(contd.) 
P(3), generation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
-4 3 2 3 12 3 7 
10 8 9 1 6 11 
2 3 7 11 9 
6 11 11 10 
X 4.00 6.50 4.00 5.25 7.75 7.75 '9.25 
A(O), generation 1 2 3 I, 4 5 6 7 8 9 
8 7 6 6 6 12 7 18 18 
11 10 11 13 7 17 18 21 
4 5 6 16 18 20 20 
15 17 15 21 21 24 
16 19 16 24 8 
X 8.00 9.00. 6.66 9.25 11.60 13.80 11.80 20.20 18.20 
A(1), generation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 1 0 2 4 7 9 
0 
3 3 5 6 3 3 
6 7 3 3 9 
5 3 9 8 
X LOO 2.00 3.00 4.75 4.00 5.50 7~25 
A (2) , generation .::.1 __ ___;2;:;.,.__ _ --=3:.....-__ ...:.4 ___ ;:;..5 ___ 6.:___ _ ~7 
6 9 9 10 3 2 6 
5 4 3 1 8 8 
3 2 5 6 5 
7 7 4 3 
X 6.00 7.00 5.33 5.50 4.00 5.00 5.50 
A(3) 
APPENDIX E. 
TABULATED RAW SCORES. (contd.) 
A(3), generation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
0 1 1 1 0 10 3 
0 0 2 11 4 11 
7 9 2 11 3 
3 11 3 8 
X 0.00 0.50 2.66 3. 75 . ·6.00 7.00 6.25 
Personality. 
P(l) s D F IJ 
4 7.35 41 7 
5 6.40 42 5 
6 8.83 53 6 
7 10.15 50 5 
8 data not collected 
9 9.64 33 6 . 
lD 7.75 61 3 
P(2) 4 5.83 39 8 
5 8.49 55 5 
6 7.21 68 2 
7 7.61 65 5 
8 12.12 42 7 
9 7.35 42 7 
10 8.12 m62 5 
APPENDIX E. 
TABULATED RAW SCORES (contd.) 
P(3) s D F IJ -
4• 7.81 61 4 
5 10.86 32 6 
6 5.39 60 3 
7 7.42 so 6 
8 6.25 41 7 
9 4.69 41 5 
10 7.49 31 8 
A(l) 4 7.48 55 7 
5 4.47 55 6 
.6 data not collected 
7 data not collected 
-
8 3.32 42 6 
. 9. . 5.10 28 9 
10 7.55 42 6 
A(2) 4 6.16. 28 5 
5 7.55 63. 2 
6 5.83 59 4 
7 11.22 66 7 
8 9.22 35 6 
9, 8.83 54 4 
10 7.14 44 6 
A(3) 4 10.50 46 5 
5 5.10 59 2 
9 7.14 40 3 
6 4.90 50 5 
10 6.16 43 6 
7 13.00 47 4 
8 13.27 37 7 
-..., ,- -r .. -
